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PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY:
DOES PUBLIC PARTICIPATION MATTER?
NATALIE GOMEZ-VELEZ*
I. INTRODUcTION
T HE headlines read: "Promote Vote Stacked: Mike Jury-Rigs Win, Protest
Roar Erupts," "Mike and Pals 'Fire' Away to End Free Pass for Schoolkids,"2
and "Bloomberg Wins on School Tests After Firing Foes."3 The subject was New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's removal of three members of the
newly configured Board of Education or Panel for Educational Policy of
the City of New York. 4 He based his removal on their anticipated vote
against his proposal to hold back third grade students based on a single
standardized test.
As the Bronx representative to the Panel, and as one of the members
opposing the third grade retention proposal who was not removed, I was
surprised by the Mayor's abrupt removal of three panel members simply to
win a vote on that proposal. I remember responding to press inquiries by
asking "what are we teaching our children about democracy?" 5 This arti-
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law. The
author thanks her colleague Sue Bryant for many helpful discussions about the
substance and focus of the article and for her invaluable comments on drafts.
Thanks also to Andrea McArdle, Michelle Anderson and all of the members of
CUNY Law summer scholarship group for their review, comments and support in
the completion of this article. This article was funded in part by a PSC-CUNY
scholarship grant. Many thanks to Tiane Patterson for her excellent research
assistance. Thanks also to the members of the Villanova Law Review for their fine
editing.
1. Celeste Katz, Joe Williams & David Saltonstall, Promote Vote Stacked: Mike
Jury-Rigs Win, Protest Roar Erupts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2004, at 5.
2. Carl Campanile & David Seifman, Mike and Pals 'Fire' Away to End Free Pass
for Schoolkids, N.Y. POST, Mar. 16, 2004, at 2.
3. David M. Herszenhorn, Bloomberg Wins on School Tests After Firing Foes, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at Al; see also Michael Winerip, On Education: Checks, Balances
and Rubber Stamps, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at B10 (discussing Bloomberg's tac-
tics with school board).
4. Although the legislation granting mayoral control retained the "Board of
Education" denomination, Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel Klein
unilaterally renamed the body the "Panel for Educational Policy": a name many
people had trouble remembering, and that was confused with the Educational Pri-
orities Panel and other organizations. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590 (McKinney 2006)
(continuing Board of Education but changing its functions); see also Minutes of
Sept. 23, 2002 Public Meeting of the Panel for Educational Policy, http://schools.
nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/A1692877-F7] 6D-48AF-8436-7D9A793F62DA/1088/
MinutesofAction92302.pdf (first meeting of reconstituted Board).
5. Many in New York's educational community expressed outrage at the
Mayor's perceived "panel-packing" to ensure that his proposal would pass regard-
less of opposition or open questions. Soon after the great uproar regarding the
(297)
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cle addresses the question of democratic participation in public school
governance more broadly. It considers what examples of public participa-
tion in public school governance can teach us about the theory and prac-
tice of democracy, and also what theories of democratic participation can
teach us about public school governance. Should a governance structure
of centralized mayoral control exclude input from parents and the public
on grounds that the mayor is the representative authorized to make deci-
sions? Further, should the only recourse for those who disagree with his
choices be at the ballot box? Or should public school governance involve
an ongoing deliberative process inclusive of public voices? Who ought to
be considered "the public" for purposes of input and involvement in poli-
cymaking, and what structures and processes best allow for meaningful
public input while maintaining the accountability and standards sought
through mayoral control?
Public participation in public school governance is an especially perti-
nent issue in light of recent trends appearing in several large cities. Those
trends tend to favor centralized mayoral control of schools. They also
highlight the changing roles of local, state and federal governments as
well as public and private actors, in developing and driving educational
policy and practice. This article will examine the question of public partic-
ipation in public school governance from the perspective of theories of
democratic participation, as related to practical realities of public school
governance. These realities reflect an urgent need to strengthen and im-
prove public education as a public responsibility.
Part II will examine various models of public school governance. It
will explore historical trends, from local to centralized control and back
again. It places these models in the context of the kind and degree of
public participation sought under the various models, and examines the
purposes public participation is meant to serve.
Part III will focus on the current example of New York City and other
cities that have recently moved to centralized mayoral control of public
schools. It will examine the centralized governance structures that have
been established, with a focus on the respective roles of the centralized
governing authority, public school parents, other community members
and the public at large. It will consider more closely how the governance
structure works "on the ground," with particular emphasis on the role that
parents and public participants play in the development and implementa-
tion of public school policy.
Mayor's stacked vote, however, the newspapers began noting a boost in the
Mayor's poll numbers, indicating popular approval of his elimination of the
scourge of so-called "social promotion" in public schools. See Elissa Gootman,
Changing the Schools: Reaction, Praise and Anger Over Mayor's Do-It-My-Way Decision,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, at B8; David M. Herszenhorn, Changing the Schools: The
Debate; Keeping Pupils in Third Grade, but Then What? N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 2007, at
Al.
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Part IV will provide a brief overview of theories of democratic partici-
pation, each calling for different degrees of public involvement. Involve-
ment ranges from a minimalist model of representative democracy where
the public's role begins and ends in the voting booth, authorizing the se-
lected leader to take action on behalf of the populace; to a deliberative
form of democracy that assumes ongoing public involvement and regular
public deliberation regarding issues of public concern as key to demo-
cratic legitimacy. Part IV will also consider the unique relationship be-
tween public education and democracy. It contemplates the degree to
which the idea that public education is designed to groom effective demo-
cratic participation influences public school governance.
Part V will propose that in establishing public school governance
structures, strong consideration should be given to hybrid governance
models. The structures should be consistent with principles of democratic
education while addressing concerns about standards and accountability.
A successful hybrid model would combine opportunities for robust local
decision-making and the inclusion of public voices with centralized ac-
countability mechanisms based on high standards.
II. MODELS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE
The structure of public school governance relates very closely to com-
munity and societal understandings of the role of public schools in a dem-
ocratic society, and the roles that parents, communities, political leaders,
elites and educational experts ought to play in determining school policy.
While some argue that governance does not significantly affect public
school outcomes, it is clear that governance choices establish greater or
lesser opportunities for public involvement and substantive success in
school reform. 6 Governance determinations can also actualize a vision of
democratic education that is designed to do more than ensure the ade-
quate acquisition of literacy and math skills.
Public school governance choices help to determine the expectations
and requirements for public schools, and the scope and limits of public
schools' authority in particular areas. Governance is the force that deter-
mines the degree to which procedures are in place to include and em-
power parents, communities and the public to support informed,
deliberative decision-making and to prepare stakeholders for broader
democratic participation. School governance presents an important ex-
ample of democracy at work. The structure of public school governance
illuminates the vision of democratic participation that is in play, whether it
is a minimalist vision that would leave most or all decision-making to a few
powerful government officials, elites and technocrats, or a more inclusive
6. See, e.g., Kavitha Mediratta & Norman Fruchter, From Governance to Accounta-
bility: Building Relationships That Make Schools Work, DRUM MAJOR INSTITUTE POuCY
REPORT (Jan. 2003) at 9 (arguing that governance alone does not achieve better
school outcomes).
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vision that values, encourages and fosters broader, ongoing public involve-
ment as part of public education's mission to prepare citizens for robust
and effective democratic participation. These questions in turn implicate
broader issues about the legitimacy of competing models of democratic
participation.
The shifts in school governance over time reflect a pendulum swing
across various forms of democratic education. Methods vary, from a lo-
cally controlled community endeavor, to an enterprise designed not only
to educate substantively, but to prepare students and communities for
democratic citizenship, to a centrally controlled, technocratic process de-
signed to prepare workers and ensure the United States' ability to com-
pete in a global marketplace. These shifts reflect more or less inclusive
visions of participation, as well as procedural and substantive efforts to
remedy perceived failures and shortcomings of the public school system. 7
The recent change in New York City from a decentralized system of
public school governance largely under local control, to a centralized sys-
tem under mayoral control, is part of a trend taking place in several large
cities across the United States.8 Although school governance continues to
be primarily a local affair, the trend toward centralization in urban school
districts is related to a trend toward increased federal and state involve-
ment in public education policymaking. The shift is driven by a quest for
greater accountability and improved achievements, particularly among
lower income students and students of color. As Kenneth Wong has ob-
served, " [m] ayoral control with a focus on performance-based accountabil-
ity has already occurred in New York, Chicago, Boston, Baltimore,
Providence, Cleveland, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia (joint mayoral and
gubernatorial control), and Los Angeles may soon follow."9 The District
of Columbia is also in the process of shifting to mayoral control. 10 The
move toward centralized, accountability-based mayoral control is occur-
ring primarily in large cities with large and diverse student populations
and not in suburban areas. This trend stands in contrast to and conflicts
with the traditional hesitation and resistance by mayors to take control of
schools from local boards. 1
7. See generally Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson, Introduction to THE PUBLIC
ScHooLs XXIII, XXXI-XXXVI (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2005) (introducing collection of articles on public schools and democ-
racy); DIANE RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 401 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2000) (suggesting centralization and local control each have advantages, but
neither is perfect solution to public school woes); Kenneth K. Wong, The Political
Dynamics of Mayoral Engagement in Public Education, HARv. EDuc. REv., Summer
2006, at 164 (advocating for shift toward mayoral control of public schooling).
8. See Wong, supra note 7, at 165 (discussing growing trend toward mayoral
involvement in public education).
9. Id. at 165.
10. See id. at 167 (highlighting "mayor-led" school board in Washington,
D.C.).
11. See id. at 164-65 (indicating mayors typically not involved in management
of public schools).
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The urban trend in public school governance should be viewed in
light of the broader history of such governance as sharing similarities with
past governance changes and as embodying some notable differences
from past governance efforts. An overview of the history of public educa-
tion in the United States demonstrates the central and ever-evolving role
that governance has played, not only in establishing and maintaining pub-
lic schools, but in managing the multiple roles and constituencies they are
asked to serve.
A. A Brief History of Public School Governance and the Rationales for
Centralized and Local Control
12
Public schools began as local enterprises. The tradition of local con-
trol over public schools dates back to the founding of the United States. 13
Based in part on a certain distrust of centralized government and in part
on practical realities, schooling was established as a local endeavor. In
addition, governance structures for schools were established separate and
apart from the structures for all other governmental entities as early as
1826.14 Education in the early agricultural United States tended to have a
religious bent and was not designed to be universal or truly "public."15 It
was not until the common schools movement of the 1830s and 1840s that
the notion of public schools designed to provide universal education and
12. This section provides only a broad overview. It is not meant to provide an
exhaustive history of school governance, but merely seeks to sketch in broad
outline the history of public school governance in the United States. It illustrates
the more recent trends in centralized and local control of schools and examines
the rationales given, comparing them to the actual function of public participation
in public school governance. For a more complete history of public school
governance, see generally RAVITCH, supra note 7 (exploring public school
governance from nineteenth century to present); FREDERICK M. WIRT & MICHAEL
W. KiRST, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION (McCutcheon
Publishing Corp. 2005) (exploring historical and current perspectives on public
school governance at local, state and federal levels).
13. See Michael Kirst, Turning Points: A History of American School Governance, in
WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? 14, 16 (Noel Epstein ed., Brookings Inst. Press 2004)
(describing local control of schools based on distrust of federal government); see
alsoJulie A. Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of Citizens, in
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 2-3 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 2005) (noting government interest and involvement in education from
founding of United States, and that schooling began as local endeavor in home
and church during early colonial period).
14. The establishment of separate school governance structures dates back to
Massachusetts's decision to create a school committee separate from the general
government, a practice adopted throughout the nation. See Kirst, supra note 13, at
16 (describing origins of "two-government tradition"). In New York State, for ex-
ample, responsibility for state-wide school governance rests not with the Governor
but with the New York State Board of Regents, which was established in 1784 to
have responsibility for all of the schools in the state, among other things. N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 2.
15. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing evolution of schooling in
America).
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to serve broad social purposes, like preparation for citizenship, moral edu-
cation and cultural unity began to take hold. As advocated by Horace
Mann in Massachusetts, Henry Barnard in Connecticut and John Pierce in
Michigan, among others, common schools were imbued with egalitarian
and majoritarian values. Designed to produce literate, numerate and
moral citizens from children of all classes, sects and ethnic groups, they
were to be Horace Mann's "great equalizer."
16
Despite the stated goals of equality, morality and education, and the
notion of common schools as designed to bring society together, 17 the
reality of the common schools was one that established and reinforced
stereotypes based on race, class, gender and national origin.18 For exam-
ple, assigned books assumed white superiority "and presented Africans as
degraded and Native Americans as noble but cruel and backward ...
African Americans were largely considered to be outside the body politic
and their children were generally excluded from public schools." 19 At the
same time, southern states resisted efforts to establish common public
schools.20 Resistance was based on fears of a class of educated blacks and
white laborers, in addition to economic difficulties and the practical
problems of providing rural education. 21 Nonetheless, the common
schools succeeded in establishing the idea of a "common education" and
in articulating an aspirational goal of developing literate, numerate citi-
zens who could participate in society on an equal basis.
Over time, the system of common schools expanded and became the
model of education in the United States, but the governance structures for
these schools were by no means uniform. As a general matter, the com-
mon schools were financed by public taxes and controlled by local trust-
ees, but their local organizational structures varied widely among the
states. 22 By the turn of the twentieth century, municipal corruption scan-
dals spurred a wave of reforms that placed schools under stronger local
16. See id.
17. See generally, Thomas Corcoran & Margaret Goertz, The Governance of Public
Education, in THE PUBLIC SCHooLs 25, 28-29 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (discussing policy conflict fueled by differing cul-
tural values).
18. See Reuben, supra note 13, at 7-8 (describing subjects taught in nineteenth
century public schools).
19. Id. at 8-9.
20. See id. (noting resistance to efforts to establish public schools in 1830's
South).
21. See id. (signaling difficulty experienced in expanding national public
school system to 1830's South).
22. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 18 (discussing evolution of schooling in
America). The common school reformers had also established state education de-
partments, but in the 1890s these entities were nowhere near the size, scope or
influence of current state education departments. See id. (discussing early role of
state education departments). The federal government initially played no role in
public education aside from providing financing through early land sales. See id.
(discussing early role of federal government in public education).
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community control. This, in turn, led to corruption on the local level
through local ward politics, involving patronage jobs and deals with con-
tractors and others.
Reformers contended that, among other things, board members
elected by wards advanced their own parochial and special interests at the
expense of the school district as a whole. What was needed to counter
this, they believed, was election at large, or citywide, without subdistrict
electoral boundaries. Much of the early experience in local control of
schools bears striking similarity to more recent complaints about the infu-
sion of politics and corruption into local-and municipal-school govern-
ance. 23 The responses by reformers, then and now, are also strikingly
similar, pitting educational elites and professionals against lay people and
local stakeholders who are charged with rendering school governance un-
professional and "too political." 24
1. Centralization
In response to concerns about local corruption and the politicization
of public schools, progressive educational elites introduced reforms that
would replace "political" education with "professional" education. The
Progressive Era reforms focused on centralization, efficiency, professional-
ism, expertise and nonpolitical control. The reformers looked to state leg-
islatures and state-wide education departments to standardize education
and consolidate schools. The reformers consisted primarily of financial
and professional leaders who appeared as offended by the "politics and
inefficiency" of the local school structures, as by the fact that the structure
"empowered members of the lower and lower-middle classes, many of
whom were recent immigrants."25 The common schools movement intro-
duced uniformity; the Progressive Era reforms introduced "the growth of
professional standards for administration, teaching, curriculum, testing,
23. See, e.g., RAVITCH, supra note 7, at 263. (highlighting corruption scandals
involving 1960's New York City school board).
24. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 19-20. Kirst notes:
By 1910, a conventional educational wisdom had evolved among the
'school folk' and the leading business and professional men who had
spearheaded these Progressive Era reforms. They sought to use state leg-
islatures and departments of education to standardize public education
and consolidate one-room schools into larger township or regional
schools. Essentially, they aimed to 'take education out of politics'-often
meaning taking it away from decentralized control by certain lay peo-
ple-and to turn 'political' issues into matters for administrative discre-
tion by professional educators. In some cases small groups of patricians
secured new charters from state legislatures and thereby reorganized ur-
ban schools without any popular vote. The watchwords of reform were
efficiency, expertise, professionalism, centralization and nonpolitical con-
trol. Taken together, reformers thought, these ideals would inspire 'one
best system.' The most attractive models for this new governance struc-
ture were the industrial bureaucracies rapidly emerging during this era.
25. Id. at 20.
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and other elements essential to the system."26 The Progressive Era re-
forms also ushered in a more centralized, professionally-based structure
for school governance and administration.
As time went on, a number of societal and political changes impacted
the public schools. The economic expansion, the baby boom and social
change that followed World War II all had various effects on public
schools. 27 Larger school enrollments, combined with a greater interest in
egalitarianism and opportunity-ideas in tension with the elitism associ-
ated with the professionalization and centralization of school govern-
ance-began to change the dynamics of school governance. 28
Centralization had also widened the gap between school policymakers and
their constituents. Also, "[p]arent participation had little effect on school
policymaking" at that time. 29
During the 1950s, confidence in local school boards and administra-
tors in the centralized public school system began to erode for a number
of reasons. Fears of a communist threat led to concerns about the nature
of "civic education," and concerns in some quarters about whether com-
munist sympathizers were teaching in the public schools.3 0 The Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education3 called attention to
the dismal failure of public school systems in the South, and elsewhere, to
educate African American students. 32 The bestselling book, Why Johnny
Can't Read,3 3 called attention to falling literacy rates. Fears of losing
ground in global competitiveness were driven by competition with the So-
viet Union in the space race in the Cold War era, as they were later by
Japan's perceived technological superiority in the 1980s. 34
This period ushered in a greater federal role in education, from the
federal courts' involvement in school desegregation following Brown, to
the federal government's passage of educational reform legislation. For
example, Congress also passed the 1957 National Defense Education Act,
designed to improve competitiveness in math, science and foreign lan-
26. Id. As Kirst goes on to note, the concerns of the time were similar to
many of those faced now: global competition, worker training, the assimilation of
immigrants, concern about children being taught in their native languages and
the need for educators to provide health and social services for poor and immi-
grant students. See id. at 21.
27. See id. at 21 (discussing adaptation of curriculums after World War II).
28. See id. (noting changes in schooling after World War II).
29. Id.
30. See Fuhrman & Lazerson, supra note 7, at XXVI (discussing 1950s citizen-
ship questions).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See Fuhrman & Lazerson, supra note 7, at XXVI (referencing Brown's de-
segregation holding); Kirst, supra note 13, at 22 (discussing weakening confidence
in local school boards and administrations in 1950s).
33. RUDOLPH FLESCH, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T READ: AND WHAT YOU CAN Do
ABOUT IT (Harper Collins 1955).
34. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 22 (describing fear of global competition in
1950s and 1980s).
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guage learning, and the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
("ESEA"), aimed at addressing unequal educational opportunity. 35 The
federal government, which had largely stayed out of public education 36 on
the understanding that the Tenth Amendment had left public school con-
trol to the states,37 began to use its spending power to play an increased
role in substantive educational policy.38 For example, in enacting the
ESEA,39 President Lyndon B. Johnson tied education money to special
needs categories addressing low income and low achieving students.
40
President Johnson was responding not only to the perceived educational
crisis but also to the civil rights movement, which highlighted gross inequi-
ties in. race and class impacting every aspect of society. 41 These inequities
were found particularly egregious in the context of public schooling.
4 2
Other federal initiatives addressing public schools included the federal
school lunch program and the provision of impact aid, which, by provid-
ing federal funding for programs with certain strings attached, imposed
federal requirements on schools. 43
35. See id. (noting federal government's increasing involvement in education
in response to fears of losing ground to Soviet Union); Reuben, supra note 13, at
18-20 (explaining post-New Deal education legislation).
36. But see Charles F. Faber, Is Local Control of Schools Still a Viable Option?, 14
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 447, 453 (1991) (noting some measure of federal involve-
ment in education). Faber writes:
Despite the United States Constitution's reservation of education as a
state responsibility, the federal government has always had some involve-
ment in and influence upon the educational affairs of the nation. The
federal government's early participation in education ranged from land
grants and distribution of surplus funds for the establishment of common
schools to special purpose grants for the establishment of land grant col-
leges in the 1800s. In the early 1900s, federal funds were provided for
vocational education.
Id.
37. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. X; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 557 (1985) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976)) (rejecting previous holding that Tenth Amendment prohibited
Congress from interfering with "traditional" state activities); see also Faber, supra
note 36, at 453 (noting reservation of education regulation to states).
38. See Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 17, at 33-36 (discussing modern expan-
sion of federal role in education policy).
39. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-10, 79
Stat. 27 (1965). The ESEA was enacted as part of President Johnson's "Great Soci-
ety" or "War on Poverty" agenda. See ELIZABETH H. DEBRAv, POLITICS IDEOLOGY &
EDUCATION 5 (Teachers College Press 2006). ESEA was presented as a "special
purpose" bill designed to provide for the education of the children of needy fami-
lies and children living in areas of high unemployment. See id.
40. See id. (describing President Johnson's broader plan to fight poverty
through education and other avenues).
41. See id. at 5-6 (noting connection between race and poverty).
42. See id. (discussing racial component in debate on poverty and education).
43. See Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 17, at 34-35 (explaining increased fed-
eral aid and involvement in public schools in 1960s); Kirst, supra note 13, at 23
(noting largely political motivations behind funding and equality programs imple-
mented at this time).
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The federal government's 1983 release of A Nation At Risk: The Impera-
tive for Educational Reform4 4 ushered in a new wave of national attention to
the need for education reform. "A Nation At Risk unleashed a more than
two-decades-long upsurge in attention to educational quality. Education
boosters in the Reagan Administration used the bully pulpit to press states
to raise standards. '4 5 New state education policies tended to be "top
down," and increasingly restrictive of local decision-making. 46 This
spawned "[a] countermovement, called the 'restructuring' movement,
which focused on giving individual schools more autonomy, encouraging
parent and community participation on school councils and making more
space for teacher decision-making in school schedules."'47 During the
Clinton Administration, the impetus toward standards-based reform con-
tinued, and was further codified in the 1994 passage of the Improving
America's Schools Act 48 and the Goals 2000: Educate America Act.4 9 The
trend toward increased federal involvement in directing school policy also
prompted objections to the expanding federal role and an effort to re-
strict the role of the federal government in education. 50 However, George
W. Bush's education agenda, far from seeking to restrict the federal role
in education, continued and expanded federal involvement in the stan-
dards and accountability movement with the passage of the No Child Left
Behind Act ("NCLB"), perhaps the most pervasive example of federal in-
volvement in the public schools to date.
Enacted as amendments to the ESEA, NCLB imposes unprecedented
federal statutory requirements and levels of scrutiny on public schools as a
prerequisite to receiving federal funding. The NCLB targets schools with
the highest proportions of low income families. The Act requires states to
set standards for academic content and student achievement that define
an adequate education for all schools and students in the state. 5 1 States
44. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform, National Comm'n on
Excellence in Education (April 1983), available at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatA-
tRisk/index.html.http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html
45. Fuhrman & Lazerson, supra note 7, at XXVII.
46. See id. (discussing A Nation at Risk reforms).
47. Id.
48. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
3518 (1994) (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections of Title 20 of
United States Code).
49. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125
(1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 20 of United States
Code).
50. For example, in 1995 a coalition of newly elected Republican House
members sought to abolish the federal Department of Education and to reduce
the federal role in supporting public education. See DEBRAY, supra note 39, at 1,
33. Also at play were differing federalism-based conceptions of the respective roles
of the federal and local governments in education policy. See id. at 33 (noting
efforts to "dismantle the traditional role of the federal government in education").
51. See NCLB, Title 1, Part A § 1114, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1471-
75 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6314) (detailing schoolwide programs under Act).
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must create annual standardized tests aligned with those standards in liter-
acy and math, and now science, in grades three to twelve. 5 2 Additionally,
states are required to report the results of performance on these tests,
identifying subgroups of students based on race, ethnicity, gender, disabil-
ity and English language capacity, among other factors. The determina-
tion of adequate yearly progress must be shown with respect to each
subgroup, as well as the school as a whole, to be deemed acceptable.
When schools fail to make adequate yearly progress for four consecutive
years, NCLB requires states to take corrective action that generally involves
restructuring of the schools through the replacement of staff and curricu-
lum. NCLB also provides that school districts must permit students in low
performing schools the option to transfer out of those schools into higher
performing schools, and must provide transportation to do so, or provide
access to supplemental educational services such as tutoring, paid for
through NCLB and school district funds.53 Further, the NCLB also re-
quires that all teachers be designated "highly qualified" in that they must
hold a bachelor's degree, demonstrate subject matter competency and
have state certification in the subjects taught.
The specificity of requirements with respect to state testing, accounta-
bility requirements, teacher preparedness and provision of detailed op-
tions for tutoring and transportation have serious implications for federal
and state involvement in educational governance. NCLB represents the
greatest degree of federal involvement in public schools to date. NCLB
has had an enormous impact on state and local school decision-making in
areas ranging from governance to curriculum to transportation. Its imple-
mentation has raised serious concerns about the emphasis on high stakes
testing and punishment, as well as a range of unintended consequences
flowing from such sweeping and detailed federal involvement in public
schooling.
2. Public Schools and the Courts
In addition to increased federal involvement in schools, through leg-
islation tied to funding and other initiatives, the Supreme Court has
shaped the legal landscape involving the scope and limits of school au-
thority. The proper scope of this authority has been shaped over time
through decisions addressing the rights of parents and students, and the
boundaries of public schools' ability to inculcate values to their pupils.5 4
52. See id. §§ 1 111(b) (1), (2) and (3) (describing NCLB's state plan require-
ments).
53. See id. §§ 1116(b) (1) (E), (b)(10). These provisions have been criticized
as diverting funds away from core instruction to transportation and mostly private
sector tutoring companies. See, e.g., Wendy Beetlestone & Owen F. Lipsett, No
Child Left Behind's Accountability and Access Provisions: An Inherent Tension Within Sup-
plemental Educational Services Programs, 216 EDuc. L. REP. 807, 813-14 (2007) (dis-
cussing concerns over diversion of funds through NCLB).
54. Early cases established parents' liberty interest in raising their children, as
well as teachers' substantive due process liberty interest in practicing their profes-
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Much federal constitutional jurisprudence addresses public education in
the contexts of equal protection,55 the separation of church and state,56
and the protection of liberty interests of parents in controlling the up-
bringing of their children. 5 7 Additionally, questions regarding teachers'
role in practicing their profession and of students' rights to free expres-
sion and access to education have also been addressed. 58
The case law addressing public education reflects ongoing tensions in
balancing individual rights against collective or community rights, individ-
sion. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court invalidated a
state law making it a criminal offense to teach students who had not completed
eighth grade in a language other than English. See id. at 403. Although Meyer most
squarely articulated the substantive due process right of teachers to pursue their
profession, the Court also identified parents' liberty interest to "establish a home
and bring up children." See id. at 399. The Court returned to the substantive due
process liberty interest of parents in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a
case striking down a state law prohibiting parents from sending children to non-
public schools. See id. at 534-35. In reemphasizing the ights of parents to choose
their children's schools, as well as the rights of students to participate in that
choice and the rights of teachers to practice their profession, the Court noted that
"[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535. Later in 1972, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the Court reaffirmed parents' liberty interest in the upbring-
ing of their children, this time in the context of protection of religious belief. See
id. at 219. Yoder involved a challenge by Amish parents to a state law requiring that
all children under the age of sixteen attend public or private school. See id. at 208-
09. The Amish parents expressed concern that a high school education would
inculcate values in their children antithetical to their own. See id. at 209. Recog-
nizing the importance of traditional values to the Amish faith, the Court found the
law directly infringed upon the freedom of the parents to exercise their religion.
See id. at 218-19; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-76
(1988) (holding First Amendment permits educators to exercise editorial control
over content of school newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86
(1986) (permitting school to limit obscene and vulgar speech within school setting
in accordance with First Amendment); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72
(1982) (recognizing constitutional limit on board's removal of books from school
library, and balancing students' rights with effective school governance); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding black arm
bands worn to school to protest Vietnam War were protected as freedom of expres-
sion); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-93, 604 (1967) (finding re-
quirement that state plan to keep communists and subversives out of state
employment was unconstitutional limit on First Amendment rights); W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (rejecting West Virginia law
which required school students participate in pledge to United States flag).
55. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding school
segregation deprives students of equal opportunities).
56. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19 (recognizing parents' right to direct re-
ligious education of children).
57. See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (affirming parents' substantive liberty right
to raise their children).
58. See id. at 400 (recognizing teachers' due process right to pursue their
profession).
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ual freedoms versus societal equality. 59 With respect to inequality of re-
sources and student achievement gaps, public education litigation has
evolved from the desegregation model set forth in Brown and its progeny,
to an emphasis on educational equity and the adequacy of school funding
based in state constitutional law.
60
As federal courts took increasingly restrictive views of desegregation
remedies, 6' litigants turned to state courts to find public school equity
relief.62 These suits, based on state constitutional requirements of educa-
tional equity and adequacy, sought to address, through judicial remedies,
longstanding educational inequality wrought by segregation and concen-
trated poverty. 63 A common state judicial remedy required states to equal-
ize per pupil expenditures across districts or, at least, ensure the provision
of an "adequate" education in every district and school.
64
Some of the state school finance equity and adequacy litigation has
resulted in greater equality of per pupil spending across districts, coupled
59. Given the role of education in preparing citizens for democracy, some
scholars argue that students' equality interests should be given precedence over
individual liberty interests to better serve the broader goals of public education.
See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Vir-
ginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 381, 448 (1999) (suggesting equality is best road to effective public educa-
tion). Morgan argues:
[P]rivileging the equality interests of K-12 students over their liberty in-
terests best allows the public education system to further democracy. Be-
cause public schools can shape the self-images, preferences, and abilities
of future generations, they are uniquely suited to break the traditions and
to reorder the hierarchies of the past. As long as that potential is har-
nessed to enhance the equality of the citizenry ... those schools will pro-
mote democratic self-government.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989)
(requiring equal opportunity to adequate education for all children within state);
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 61 (N.Y. 2006) (affirming
legislative grant of funds to New York schools and finding accounting mechanisms
adequate); see alsoJames S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 201-02 (2003) (discussing state's seeking equality in
education through equal funding).
61. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 200. (stating "the upshot was to
limit intervention to cases where officials publicly proclaimed their desire to dis-
criminate and publicly exhibited their segregative successes"). Recently, the Su-
preme Court has gone even further to eviscerate desegregation remedies, turning
the federal equal protection clause on its head to prohibit school districts from
voluntarily engaging in efforts to integrate schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty.
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767-68 (2007) (rejecting Seattle
voluntary plan of race-based integration of schools).
62. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 201 (noting that state courts were
primary venue for equity relief).
63. See id. at 201-05 (describing suits in state courts).
64. See id. at 202-05 (providing examples of remedies available in state court
suits).
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with increased funding in some poorly financed districts. 65 These cases
yielded an increase in the state's contribution to public school funding,
often accompanied by a concomitant reduction in a locality's share.
6 6
Many cases, however, did not create overall increases in expenditures in
subject states.67 Moreover, even in those school districts where lawsuits
increased per pupil spending requirements, significant educational im-
provement did not take place.68
In many instances, litigation seeking greater equity in public schools
sprang from, and reinforced broader movements for, civil rights and social
justice. 6 9 Increased parent and public attention to school governance
arose from the general concern for civil rights, spurring challenges to seg-
regationist and exclusionary control of public schools, and providing im-
petus for the call to decentralize school governance and increase local
control.7 0 In addition, this concern over the role and operation of public
schools manifested during the civil rights era gave rise to new movements
seeking to address a range of subjects such as women's issues, the rights of
ethnic and linguistic minorities, 7 1 special education issues and students'
65. See id. (stating result of state lawsuits).
66. See id. (same).
67. See id. (same).
68. See id. at 203-04 (same); see also Maurice Dyson, Playing Games with Equality:
A Game Theoretic Critique of Educational Sanctions, Remedies, and Strategic Noncompli-
ance, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 577, 632-33 (2004) (noting educational improvements on
whole did not result from suits). But see Eliot Spitzer, A Contract for Excellence, U.S.
STATE NEWS, 2007 WLNR 13126831 (seeking to improve New York public educa-
tion); Ambitious Legislative Agendas Move Ahead, 26 EDUC. WEEK 32, Apr. 11, 2007, at
20 (discussing former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer's revamping of school
funding formula and provision of additional funding through Contracts for Excel-
lence following Campaign for Fiscal Equity case). The degree to which these addi-
tional expenditures will improve student outcomes remains to be seen. See id.
69. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Pri-
vacy, and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democ-
racy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353, 1375-92 (2005) (describing circumstances surrounding
drive for equality in public schools); Gail Robinson, New York Schools: Fifty Years
After Brown, GOTHAM GAZETrE (May 17, 2004), http://gothamgazette.com/arti-
cle/20040517/200/981 (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (noting role of Campaign for Fis-
cal Equity lawsuit in New York in mobilizing communities to support adequate
education for black and Latino students segregated in substandard New York City
public schools).
70. See generally James W. Lowe, Note, Examination of Governmental Decentraliza-
tion in New York City and a New Model for Implementation, 27 HA~v. J. ON LEGIS. 173,
205 (1990) (describing community dissatisfaction with school system operation
and public reaction).
71. See Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 423 F. Supp. 647, 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (determining public school students of Hispanic origin are enti-
tled to bilingual education program under consent decree); Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (holding school system's failure to provide English language
instruction effectively denied children of Chinese ancestory opportunity to partici-
pate in public educational program).
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rights. 72 Together, these movements resulted in a push for increased lo-
cal and community control of schools. Proponents believed that such lo-
cal control would increase parental involvement, community participation
and improve the representation of a broad array of groups in educational
governance. 73 Additionally, they believed such changes would aid in com-
bating the elitism, exclusion and inequality that many argued had been
fostered by centralization.
7 4
3. Decentralization
In New York City, these forces converged to support a movement
seeking to decentralize the school system and permit greater parent and
community involvement in school policymaking. As a result,
On April 30, 1969 after much debate, the [New York] State
Legislature passed the legislation which . . . established an in-
terim board of five members each of whom was appointed by one
of the five borough presidents. This was the first time the bor-
ough presidents were given the authority to appoint members to
the city board since 1902. Although the interim board was origi-
nally supposed to be replaced in a year by an elected board, the
election was never held because it violated the principle of one
person, one vote. In 1973 the Legislature made the interim
board permanent and gave the mayor the power to appoint two
additional members. The City Board of Education was author-
ized to appoint a Chancellor in place of a superintendent of
schools.
The interim board was directed to divide the city into 30 to
33 community school districts, each to contain an average of
20,000 students.75 Community school boards to be elected by
proportional representation were granted substantial operating
powers over all education in their districts except high schools,
subject to the ultimate authority of the Chancellor and the city
Board.76
72. For further discussion of issues regarding public school operation that
were spurred by civil rights era, see Reuben, supra note 13, at 19; Kirst, supra note
13, at 23.
73. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 23 (noting push for change resulting from civil
rights era).
74. See id. at 24 (noting rise of educational interest groups seeking to address
issues of equality and inclusion such as challenges to use of IQ tests and tracking to
detriment of students of color); see also Lowe, supra note 70, at 204 ("According to
its critics, the Board of Education was inefficient, unresponsive, uninnovative, and
out of touch with the needs of its pupils, particularly minorities and immigrants.").
75. In 1973 the number was reduced to 15,000.
76. New York State Senate Majority Task Force on NYC School Governance,
NYC School Governance: Crossroads to the Future, Leg. 941.8-4 NYCSG 204.4266 C2 at
1-2 (2002) [hereinafter Padavan Report] (describing current framework for school
governance in NYC).
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The central board was charged with selecting the schools' Chancellor
and making citywide school policy decisions. 77 The board then worked in
conjunction with local community school boards. 78 The local boards were
elected according to school district boundaries, and were responsible for
selecting community superintendents and district personnel, as well as set-
ting local school policy. 79
The decentralized school governance system received mixed reviews,
and was ultimately deemed unsuccessful by a majority of observers. 80
While decentralization allowed for the potential of robust input and com-
munity involvement in school decision-making, the system often suffered
from a lack of interest and involvement by parents and communities. The
decentralized structure was subject to pressure by local political and spe-
cial interests and suffered from a lack of clear accountability. Often, there
was no particular person or entity within the structure clearly responsible
for particular policy decisions. The central board also became known for
the contentiousness and politicization of its meetings.8 1
While some local boards managed to operate in a relatively effective,
inclusive and productive manner, many, and perhaps most, did not.8 2 In-
stead, a majority of local boards lacked the capacity or expertise to govern
effectively, which when combined with inequalities of power and the insin-
uation of political patronage and other corrupt practices, meant that often
the public schools were treated as job programs and school boards were
seen as platforms for launching political careers.8 3 Perhaps the biggest
complaint about the decentralized system was the lack of accountability.8 4
Parents and the public became increasingly frustrated with the inability to
identify who was responsible for the persistent shortcomings in public
schools.8 5 Teachers and local boards would blame the central administra-
tion, while central board members would place blame locally or point fin-
gers at each other, the mayor and state representatives.8 6
Despite these issues and an original intent for the system to merely
serve as an interim one, the decentralized Citywide Board of Education
and Community School Boards in New York remained in place for more
than twenty years. The sheer length of time it took to revisit New York
City's governance structure evidenced the difficulty legislative leaders en-
77. See id. at 8-9 (describing role of central board).
78. See id. (same).
79. See id. (same).
80. See id. at 19 (describing reasons decentralized model was considered
unsuccessful).
81. See generally Abby Goodnough, A New Sort of School Board, Bland and Calm,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at Al (referencing contentiousness of Board of Educa-
tion prior to New York's shift to mayoral control).
82. See Padavan Report, supra note 76.
83. See id. at 2 (noting how complexity was ineffective).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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countered in agreeing upon both an appropriate governance model and
effective practical improvements to the existing system.
8 7
B. The Push for Re-Centralization and Mayoral Control
Over the past several years, a trend toward centralized mayoral con-
trol has taken hold in large urban school districts across the country.
88
The rationales for a move to centralized control include the lack of focus
and accountability in decentralized governance systems, as well as a lack of
progress in improving achievement levels, graduation rates, physical plants
and resource allocation in urban public schools. 89 Perhaps most interest-
ing about this move toward centralization is the emphasis placed on the
mayor as the centralizing force. Although structural issues vary from city
to city, many of the arguments for mayoral control are similar. They in-
clude desires to improve fiscal efficiency and coordination of services,
strengthen accountability, support the city's investment in its economic
future, enhance public confidence and increase parental engagement in
public schools. 90
Increased federal and state control also serves as an impetus towards
centralization and mayoral control. Some critics of centralization argue it
is motivated by a class- and race-based effort to consolidate control of
schools in the hands of elitist white power brokers, while marginalizing
parents and local participants, who tend to be people of color.9 1 Support-
ers, however, argue that the increased accountability that comes with cen-
tralization is necessary to achieve substantive improvement in schools,
particularly urban schools serving primarily students of color.92 Mayoral
87. See id. (noting trouble faced by leaders in agreeing on governance model
and practical improvements).
88. See generally Wong, supra note 7, at 165 (noting trend toward mayoral con-
trol); Mayors Increasingly Seek to Take Charge of Schools, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-01-07-mayors-schools-x.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (same). But see Wong, supra note 7, at 167 (noting,
however, that vast majority of public school systems, particularly suburban school
districts, remain under local control).
89. See Wong, supra note 7, at 165-66 (stating rationales for centralized con-
trol); see also Padavan Report, supra note 76, at 2 (noting that "mix between cen-
tralization and decentralization [is described] as the worst of both worlds");
Martha T. Moore, More Mayors Move to Take Over Schools, USA TODAY, March 20,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2007-03-20-cover-mayor-schools
_N.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (stating "[t]he push for mayoral control reflects
rising frustration and desperation over poor student achievement, crumbling
buildings, bureaucratic wrangling among school officials, and revolving-door
superintendents").
90. 91. See Wong, supra note 7, at 165-66 (listing proponents' arguments for
mayoral control).
91. See id. at 166 (noting "[t] here are also concerns about the extent to which
minority communities can be marginalized in a seemingly recentralized authority
system").
92. See, e.g., Dyson, supra note 68, at 582 (arguing in favor of more robust
accountability mechanisms).
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control in many cities has also been associated with market-based school
reforms centered on notions of school choice and competition.9 3 It also
tends to be related to rhetoric about the need for school reform based
primarily on the relationship drawn between effective education and the
economy.
9 4
The structural models establishing mayoral control in large cities vary
depending on the existing public education governance structures, and
the respective roles of city and state actors. As Kenneth Wong notes:
Mayor-appointed school boards are typically established
through one of the three legislative processes. First, the state leg-
islature can grant authority to the mayor to replace an elected
board with an appointed board, as seen in Chicago. Second, the
legislature can call for a citywide referendum on whether to
grant the mayor the authority to appoint the school board, as was
done in Boston and Cleveland. Finally, voters can approve
changes in the city charter to allow the mayor to appoint school
board members.
95
As a general matter, the change to centralized control seeks to re-
place systems in which mayors have little direct control and school govern-
ance responsibility is diffuse, with systems containing clearer lines of
accountability. 96 For example, Washington, D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty re-
cently stated that his proposal to provide for mayoral control of public
schools will streamline responsibility by placing decision-making authority
squarely with the Mayor and allow coordination of educational initiatives
93. For an interesting critique of school choice reforms, see Martha Minow,
Reforming School Reform, 68 FoRDHAM L. Rrv. 257, 257-58 (1999) (stating "society
has had far more success generating individual schools of higher quality rather
than widespread high quality schooling"); see also Maurice Dyson, Putting Quality
Back into Equality: Rethinking the Constitutionality of Charter School Enabling Legislation
& Centric School Choice in a Post-Grutter Era, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 (2004) (noting
difficulties in reforming schools).
94. See generally National Center on Education and the Economy, TOUGH
CHOICES FOR TOUGH TIMES: THE REPORT OF THE NEW COMMISSION ON THE SKILLS OF
THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE (Jossey-Bass 2007); see also Wendy D. Puriefoy, The Edu-
cation of Democratic Citizens: Citizen Mobilization, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note
17, at 237, 237 ("By the turn of the twenty-first century, however, it is economics
rather than democracy that has the strongest impact on the form and level of
public engagement in the United States."). As a general matter, we need to ask
ourselves as a society whether the fundamental purpose of education is to serve the
economy or whether the broader purpose of developing human potential and sup-
porting human dignity is and ought to remain the primary goal.
95. Wong, supra note 7, at 166-67.
96. See Mayor's Education Proposal, Education Reform Snapshot, District of
Columbia Mayor's Office, http://ec.rrc.dc.gov/ec/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=582913
[hereinafter Task Force on School Governance Reform] (describing mayor's role
under previous structure and noting State Education Office administers federal
child nutrition programs, verifies school enrollment, develops residency verifica-
tion rules, administers state scholarship grants and oversees office of public char-
ter school financing and support).
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from pre-kindergarten through the college level with adult education pro-
grams. 97 Centralized mayoral control, according to Mayor Fenty, will facil-
itate controlled spending by consolidating functions and coordinating
services with other city agencies, allowing quicker renovation of schools
and the engagement of other city agencies' support for schools. 98 The
city's current Board of Education oversees both local and state functions
under the State Education Agency and the Local Education Agency, a
structure that presents regulatory conflict between the Board's state and
local role. 99 Under the mayoral control proposal, the existing Board will
be replaced with an entirely elected Board, whose responsibilities will be
limited to overseeing state-level education decisions in the district, and
approving state education standards and the district's accountability plan
under NCLB. 10 0 The bulk of administrative, curricular and governance
responsibility will rest with the mayor. Thus, the mayor will be primarily,
and prominently, accountable for the public schools.10 a
III. NEW YORK CITY: A CASE STUDY IN MAYORAL CONTROL OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
As with other urban school districts, the move to re-centralize New
York City's schools through mayoral control was preceded by an ongoing
sense of crisis dating back several years. In addition, support for mayoral
control was garnered by continued concern about inequality of educa-
tional opportunity, lack of achievement and the impact of educational me-
diocrity on global competitiveness, combined with dissatisfaction with the
inefficiency and lack of accountability of the decentralized public school
structure. 10 2 The problems stemming from locally controlled school
boards also increased support for mayoral control. 10 3 Stories of ineffec-
tive and sometimes corrupt local school boards coupled with the low sali-
ence of school board elections, in which few people voted and even fewer
people sought election, provided scant support for retaining the local
elective school board structure.
10 4
The first attempts at school governance change since the decentrali-
zation of the New York City school system took place in the late 1990s and
97. See id. (describing mayoral control proposal).
98. See id. (setting forth benefits to centralized control).
99. See id. (detailing role of Board of Education).
100. See id. (stating board make-up under Mayor's proposal)
101. See id. (describing Mayor's role in proposed structure).
102. See, e.g., Final Report of the Task Force on Community School District
Governance Reform § 2 (Feb. 15, 2003), http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/
NYCSchGov/20030219/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (noting concerns leading to
increased support for mayoral control).
103. See id. (same).
104. See Lydia Segal, Corruption Moves to the Center: An Analysis of New York's
1996 School Governance Law, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 323, 329-32 (1999) (describing
litany of problems with local structure and calls for reform that followed).
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2000.105 These first attempts included reforms aimed at school custodians
in response to incidents of abuse, corruption and negligence. 10 6 Even
broader governance changes took place in 1996 under the New York City
School Governance Reform Act.10 7 The 1996 governance change was de-
signed "to promote greater accountability by establishing clearer lines of
authority and responsibility, enhancing parental and staff involvement in
local decision making, providing for a process of school-based budgeting
and expenditure reporting, and modifying the existing school district elec-
tion provisions." 10 8
The 1996 legislation broadened the powers of the Chancellor, limited
the powers of the City Board of Education to policymaking activities and
eliminated the executive and administrative powers of community school
boards. Further, the legislation specified the principal as the administra-
tive and instructional leader of the school, subject to Chancellor's regula-
tions and collective bargaining agreements. 10 9
The 1996 governance legislation also contained provisions designed
to increase parental, staff and community involvement in the schools.
This increased involvement included directives to ensure compliance with
"[s]tate and federal law and regulations regarding school-based manage-
ment and shared decision making, in a manner that balances participation
by parents with participation by school personnel in advising in the deci-
sions devolved to schools."' 1 0 The 1996 law also changed the procedures
for school board elections by transferring control from the City Board of
Education to the City Board of Elections. 111
Additional legislative changes in the year 2000 eliminated lifetime
tenure for principals, established performance and discipline standards
for principals and supervisors and created a teacher recruitment and re-
tention program entitled "Teachers of Tomorrow." 112 Nonetheless, the
105. See Padavan Report, supra note 76, at 1-2 (detailing early attempts at
school governance change).
106. See id. (same).
107. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590 (McKinney 2007) (setting forth broader gov-
ernance changes); see also Segal, supra note 104, at 333-35 (1999) (describing
events leading up to resulting legislative changes).
108. See Padavan Report, supra note 76, at 4 (describing purpose of govern-
ance changes).
109. See id. at 4-10 (describing scope of 1996 legislation).
110. Id. at 13 (same).
111. See id. at 14 (further detailing 1996 legislation).
112. See id. at 17 (describing "Teachers of Tomorrow" program). During the
same period, some non-governance changes were also made in the New York City
School System. See id. at 17 (detailing other changes). For example, in 1999 the
Board of Education established a policy prohibiting "social promotion." Chancel-
lor's Regulation A-501, issued October 14, 1999, designates the criteria necessary
for promotion to the next grade level and supersedes all other regulation gov-
erning student promotion. See id. (same). The regulation clearly states the re-
quirements necessary for a seventh grader to be promoted to the eighth grade. See
id. (same). Promotion is based on an assessment of whether the student: (1) meets
New York City Performance Standards in Language Arts and Mathematics as evi-
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push for mayoral control continued. The rationales given in support of
mayoral control in New York City echoed many of those provided in other
urban school districts.' 13 The perception of a lack of accountability, com-
bined with the sense of crisis created by low student achievement levels,
public dissatisfaction on issues ranging from curriculum to violence and
concerns over corruption and crumbling infrastructure built support for
centralized control.
When Michael Bloomberg became New York City Mayor in 2002, he
made public education a signature issue. He was determined to move be-
yond the governance changes already made, and sought more direct con-
trol of public education than even that provided under the revised
governance structure.' 1 4 Pushing hard with the idea that he was willing to
be held accountable for the public schools, Bloomberg secured mayoral
control of the schools with a few caveats and compromises. 115 In granting
mayoral control, however, the New York State legislature seemed intent on
denced by student work, teacher evaluation and grades; (2) achieves at or above
Proficiency Level Two on the Citywide CTB-Reading Assessment; (3) achieves at or
above Proficiency Level Two on the Citywide CTB-Mathematics; (4) attains ninety
percent attendance. According to the regulation, "[d]ecisions regarding promo-
tion will consider all the stated criteria for each grade. The decision to promote or
retain may not be based on consideration of a sole criterion." Id. (emphasis ad-
ded). Like the governance changes that preceded the 2002 shift to mayoral con-
trol, comparatively little attention was given to standards changes made in the late
1990s and prior to the 2002 governance change. See id. (describing governance
changes).
113. For further discussion of rationales supporting mayoral control, see
supra notes 83 through 96 and accompanying text.
114. See Task Force Report on School Governance Reform, supra note 97; see
also Padavan Report, supra note 76, at 19 (describing Mayor's responsibility).
[The Mayor] exercise [d] great control with respect to the school budget,
and defacto but not direct control over the School's Chancellor ...
What the Mayor has always lacked is 'direct accountability' for the schools
and school performance. Mayors have been able to reduce school fund-
ing, while the instructional and operational interaction between the
Chancellor, Central Board, and Community School Boards has captured
the public's attention and scorn for system failings and un-
derperformance. By granting the Mayor direct accountability through
the appointment of a Chancellor coupled with his budgetary powers, the
executive branch will have for the first time since decentralization, re-
sponsibility for schools and student performance. Having that locus of
administrative and budgeting power in the executive branch will require
great rectitude by those present and future occupants of City Hall, and
continuous scrutiny by the New York City Council through the checks
and balances of City budget negotiations.
Id.
115. See, e.g., Bloomberg Takes Control as Schools Debate Continues, N.Y. AMsER-
DAm NEws, June 13, 2002, at 1-2, available at 2002 WLNR 11700338 (noting excep-
tions to mayoral control of schools). As noted below, the legislation granting
mayoral control in New York City is scheduled to sunset in 2009. See infra note
139 and accompanying text.
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assuring accountability while also maintaining mechanisms for public in-
put and parental participation.' 16
A. The Statutory Structure of New York City Public School Governance Under
Mayoral Control
State legislation gave New York City's Mayor clear control through the
power to appoint and remove the Chancellor, thus making the Depart-
ment of Education a mayoral agency, 11 7 while still retaining elements of
parental and public participation at the citywide and local, district and
school levels.' 18 The City Board of Education was reconfigured to com-
prise thirteen members: one appointed by each of the five borough presi-
dents, seven appointed by the Mayor, and the Chancellor as Chair.1 19 All
of the members serve at the pleasure of their appointing authority, and
none may simultaneously serve in any capacity as an employee of the City
of New York, a subdivision thereof or the City Board. 120 The borough
presidents' appointees must be parents of students currently enrolled in
New York City public schools. 12 1 The members of the Board receive no
compensation and have no staff, offices or vehicles. 122 They are reim-
bursed for reasonable and necessary expenditures made in connection
with their duties. 123 The newly configured Board was given primarily advi-
sory functions; however, it retained the power to vote on matters of educa-
tional policy.'
24
The Community District Education Councils, "CDECs," established as
part of the mayoral control legislation, retained none of the powers to
116. See infra notes 119-39 and accompanying text.
117. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-b (McKinney 2007) (outlining new mayoral
powers).
118. See id. (setting forth New York City's mayoral control legislation).
119. See id. § 2590-b(1) (a) (describing structure of City Board of Education).
120. See id. (stating qualifications for board members).
121. See id. (same).
122. See id. § 2590-b(1) (a) (placing limitations on compensation of board
members); see also Joe Williams, Gone With the Board of Ed: No Pricey Perks for New
School Panelists, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2002, at 1 (noting that prior incarnation
of Board of Education was criticized for misuse of vehicles, offices and other
"perks"); Abby Goodnough, A New Sort of School Board, Bland and Calm, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at Al (stating that "the new law bars panel members from having
offices and other city-financed perks").
123. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590-b(1) (a) (McKinney 2007) (setting forth appro-
priate reimbursements for board members).
124. See id. § 25 90g(l) (stating that board is to have no executive or adminis-
trative functions, but is policymaking entity).
The board shall have the power and duty to (a) approve standards, poli-
cies, objectives, and regulations proposed by the chancellor directly re-
lated to educational achievement and student performance, and (b)
consider and approve any other standards, policies, objectives, and regu-
lations as specifically authorized or required by state or federal
regulation [.]
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appoint superintendents or principals that had been previously held by
Community School Boards. 125 They were, however, co-extensive with the
old school district lines and were intended to play an advisory and consult-
ative role with respect to educational policy and budget issues in their dis-
tricts. 126 The CDECs are composed primarily of parents of children
enrolled in the public schools in the district.127 CDECs were given the
responsibility to "[r]eview the districts' educational programs and assess
their effect on student achievement," 1 28 prepare district report cards 129
and hold public meetings at least every month with the superintendent to
give parents and community members a voice. 130 Additionally, CDECs
were charged with submitting an annual evaluation of the superinten-
dent,13 1 holding a public hearing on the district's annual capacity plan,
approving and submitting such plan to the Chancellor and the city board
for approval and implementation 13 2 and providing input to the Chancel-
lor and the city board on matters of concern, among other things.133 The
legislation also provided for training of CDEC members in performing
their duties.' 3
4
Thus, the legislation, while giving the Mayor significant control and
accountability, retained a role for parents and members of the public to
provide oversight, input and policy direction on certain educational policy
and budgetary decisions. It also included requirements for the provision
of information by the City's education department to the Panel and
125. See id. § 2590-b(2) (setting forth role of CDECs).
126. See id. (establishing community councils for each community district).
With respect to the Community District Education Councils, the law provides that
the Chancellor "shall consult with the affected community district education coun-
cil before substantially expanding or reducing an existing school or program or
instituting any new program," and that the Chancellor "shall annually advise the
CDECs regarding the form and content of budget requests." Id.
127. See id. § 2590-c (1) (a) (McKinney 2007) (stating that nine of eleven vot-
ing members of each council must be parents whose children attend school in
district). The remaining two voting members are appointed by the borough presi-
dent for the district and must be residents or business owners/operators within the
district who have extensive business, trade or education experience. See id. § 2590-
c (1)(b) (setting forth makeup of boards). In addition there is one non-voting
member who is a high school senior residing in the district. See id. § 2590-c(1) (c)
(same). The non-parent voting members serve for two-year terms that are renewa-
ble for no more than one additional two-year term. See id. § 2590-c(1) (a),(b)
(same).
128. See id. § 2590-e(13).
129. See id. § 2590-e(8) (setting forth CDECs' responsibilities).
130. See id. § 2590-e(14) (same).
131. See id. § 2590-e(15) (same).
132. See id. § 2590-e(17) (same).
133. See id. § 2590-e(18) (same).
134. See id. § 2590-e(1)-(6) (same).
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CDECs' 3 5 and retained state oversight. 136 Importantly, the mayoral con-
trol legislation was enacted for a limited period of time only: it is set to
expire in 2009.137
B. The Practice of Governance and Public Participation Under Mayoral
Control in New York City
Despite the legislature's continuation of a re-configured Board of Ed-
ucation and establishment of Community District Education Councils, it
became clear early on that the Mayor and the Schools Chancellor had very
little interest in the Boards or the CDECs. The early meetings of the Board
of Education, dubbed the "Panel for Educational Policy" by the Chancel-
lor and the Mayor, were largely ministerial. 138 Many of the matters
brought before the Panel were presented with little, if any, information
prior to meetings, and thus virtually no opportunity to engage in meaning-
ful discussion. Policy and structural changes were presented for a vote
with the expectation that the panel would simply approve them proforma.
To address concerns about the lack of information provided and lack
of opportunity for deliberation prior to issues being presented for a vote,
several Panel members requested a series of meetings and briefings with
the Schools Chancellor and his staff. The Panel also set about reviewing
and revising its bylaws to clarify its role and responsibilities, and to set
forth minimum requirements for notice and information about issues to
be put on the Panel's agenda.139 This process led to an increased provi-
sion of information prior to meetings. Additionally, it allowed items to be
scheduled for a vote and led to useful, substantive discussions among
Panel members, the Chancellor, Department staff, parents and commu-
nity members. In this process, Panel members had the opportunity to
alert the Chancellor to issues that would prove problematic on the local
level. Panel members were also able to engage in dialogue about alterna-
tive ways of handling proposed structural and policy changes.
Over the first several months, the Panel and the Chancellor appeared
to be working together. Panel members would be provided relevant infor-
mation in advance of the announcement of policy initiatives and in turn,
participated in guiding policy development and alerting the Department
135. See id. § 2590-d(2) (b) (requiring provision of "full factual information
pertaining to matters of pupil achievement").
136. See id. § 2564(3) (McKinney 2007) (noting requirement of approval of
Regents before delegating power to local boards).
137. See id. § 2590 (McKinney 2007) (pointing out expiration date of mayoral
control).
138. See Goodnough, A New Sort of School Board, Bland and Calm, supra note
124 (noting unanimous adoption of four agenda items in fourty-five minute
meeting).
139. See PANEL FOR EDUC. POL'Y OF THE DEP'T OF EDUC. OF THE CITY SCH. DIST.
OF N.Y., BY-LAws 10 (Feb. 10, 2004), http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/FC48
1D23-6161-4BCA-A8BF-EOE4F569D9AA/1076/ByLaws.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2008) (detailing role of panel).
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of Education to perceived benefits and drawbacks of their proposals. Iron-
ically, this participatory process was at its most active, and seemingly most
productive, just prior to consideration of the Mayor's third grade reten-
tion policy. For example, during the winter of 2003-2004, the Chancellor
held a series of briefings during which Panel members were informed that
the Department of Education would be implementing a process of low-
stakes assessments to help teachers determine students' progress and re-
spond to their needs on an ongoing basis during the school year. Panel
members responded positively to this plan, which would not only provide
ongoing support tailored to student needs, but also further professional
development training. The plan also had support in the education re-
search and local school communities.
Before details about the low-stakes assessment plan were finalized,
however, the Mayor and Chancellor suddenly announced a third grade
retention plan. Under that plan, students would be held back if they
failed a single standardized test given at the end of the school year. The
plan was presented as part of an effort to "end social promotion," citing
the fact that struggling students were routinely passed from grade to grade
without having mastered the necessary skills. Ultimately, these students
either dropped out of school or graduated without the appropriate aca-
demic preparation. 140 Unlike the low-stakes assessment plan, there was
little, if any, support in educational research for this retention plan. In
fact, the overwhelming evidence presented to the Panel indicated that
high-stakes testing does not further student achievement, it increases fu-
ture dropout rates and even constitutes an improper use of standardized
tests. 4 1 The introduction of this proposal prompted a great deal of dis-
cussion and requests for research support. Additionally, the high-stakes
plan set off a public furor, with many parents and education advocates
strongly opposed to the idea of using a single standardized test as the basis
for retaining third graders. While many agreed that students should not
simply be passed along without having mastered the material for a particu-
lar grade, the propriety of using a single standardized test as the basis for
retention was questioned.
The issue received significant press attention and spurred campaigns
both for and against the proposal. Panel members were contacted by both
telephone and e-mail, and educational advocacy organizations sent reports
of research findings to Panel members and to the Department of Educa-
tion. 14 2 The vote on the third grade retention plan, or the plan to "end
140. For a discussion of how no reference was made to the fact that there
already existed a policy to end social promotion enacted in 1999, see supra note
113 and accompanying text.
141. See generally FIRST Do No HARM: A RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED NEW YORK
CITY THIRD GRADE RETENTION POLICY (Mar. 2004), http://www.ncscatfordham.
org/binarydata/files/FirstDo NoHarm.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (evaluat-
ing retention policy).
142. See Elissa Gootman, Test Policy for 3rd Graders is Met by More Resistance, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at B2 (describing rentention plan discussions); David M. Her-
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social promotion" as the Mayor referred to it, was scheduled for March 15,
2004. In the weeks and days before the meeting, Panel members met and
discussed the plan with the Chancellor and representatives of the Depart-
ment of Education. Some progress was made in establishing an appeals
process for students and parents who could demonstrate the standardized
test did not reflect the individual student's level of achievement.143 Agree-
ment on added instructional support for students and a more detailed
plan for summer school to provide students with an opportunity to ad-
vance to the next grade was also reached. 14 4 This process embodied delib-
erative democracy at its best. It involved a robust, inclusive and
substantive discussion of a pending policy initiative by various stakeholders
and decision-makers. Still, there was concern about opposition to inap-
propriate use of a single test to determine retention. Discussions regard-
ing the possibility of requiring an additional indicator prior to holding
back a student continued up until the day before the meeting.
On the day of the meeting, some Panel members reported having
received telephone calls from the Mayor's office regarding their planned
vote on the "social promotion" proposal. Later in the afternoon, less than
two hours before the scheduled public meeting, Panel members began to
hear that certain other members had been "fired." These included two
mayoral appointees, Susana Torruella Leval and Ramona Hernandez, and
one borough appointee, Joan McKeever Thomas of Staten Island. By the
time of the scheduled meeting, the day's activities were evident. The
Mayor had summarily removed three of the eight members who planned
to vote against his "social promotion" plan. The result of these removals
was that instead of a vote of eight to five against the proposal, he would
garner a vote of eight to five in its favor. Three new panel members ap-
peared in place of those who had just been removed. Upon learning of
the removals and replacements, many in the public audience expressed
outrage, creating an uproar at the meeting.
When the "social promotion" proposal came up for a vote, I made a
motion to table the matter 145 because the three new Panel members had
not had any opportunity to consider it. Further, I thought an opportunity
still remained for finding a consensus on using an additional indicator to
determine retention. That motion, initially ignored by the Chancellor,
was later voted down, and, as anticipated after the removal of Panel mem-
bers, the "social promotion" plan succeeded by a vote of eight to five. 146
szenhorn, Chancellor Pushes Mayor's School Promotion Policy as Crucial Vote Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at N37 (same).
143. See Elissa Gootman, Appeals Process for 3rd Graders Explained, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2004, at B6 (detailing parental efforts to change retention plan).
144. See Elissa Gootman & Mike McIntire, Klein Is Said to Oppose Delay in 3rd
Grade Retention Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at B3 (same).
145. See Winerip, supra note 3 (describing motion made to panel).
146. See id. (providing vote outcome).
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In the immediate wake of the March 15 meeting, many in the press
and the public expressed extreme disappointment and disbelief about the
way in which Panel members were removed in order to obtain a particular
vote. In the days and weeks that followed, however, many in the popular
press applauded the Mayor for taking control of the situation and forcing
the vote to end "social promotion." This move had significant political
support outside of educational circles, which presumably was based on its
commonsense appeal. Following this highly contentious meeting, little at-
tention was given to the meetings of the Panel, other than one or two
sessions working towards providing additional support for schools most
impacted by the retention policy. Early criticisms that the reconfigured
Board of Education was nothing more than a "paper tiger" appeared to
have been confirmed by the events of the March 15 meeting. Indeed, the
level of public interest in the meetings of, and agenda before, the Panel
has declined steadily over the past three years.
147
Similarly, the Community District Education Councils have played, at
most, a very minor role in educational governance. 14 8 Since their incep-
tion, lack of interest among parents in serving on the councils has been
raised. This lack of interest is evidenced by the de minimis participation of
parents and community members at council meetings, the lack of training
and the failure of the Department of Education to provide timely informa-
tion necessary to the effective functioning of the councils. In fact, a report
assessing CDECs in the borough of Manhattan found that the vast majority
of council members surveyed had not been trained in one or more of the
CDEC state-mandated functions. Furthermore, a majority of council
members stated that their respective council was not able to fulfill one or
more of its responsibilities mandated under the law. The report also con-
firmed concerns about low participation in the councils, noting that a
large percentage of council members had resigned, many councils failed
to make quorum at least once and most monthly council meetings were
attended by twenty-five or fewer members of the public. The report fur-
ther noted that the Department of Education's oversight of councils had
shifted in 2006 from the Deputy Chancellor for Teaching and Learning,
responsible for instructional policy and parent engagement, to the Senior
Counselor for Public and Community Affairs, presumably responsible for
public relations.
Indeed, since the implementation of mayoral control, parents and
members of the public have cited a lack of inclusion and responsiveness by
147. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch & Randi Weingarten, Public Schools, Minus the Pub-
lic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A33 (assessing importance of Panel in wake of
March 15 meeting); Ellen Yan, The Parent Trap: Moms, Dads Say City Schools Reorgani-
zation Hasn't Given Them Any More Say, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 2005, at A14 (same).
148. See generally Scott Stringer, PARENTS DISMISSED: AN ANALYSIS OF MANHAT-
TAN'S COMMUNITY EDUCATION COUNCILS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S
ROLE IN ENGAGING PARENT LEADERS (June 2006), http://www.mbpo.org/uploads/
PARENTS%20DISMISSED.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (evaluating New York
public school system).
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the Department of Education to educational policy concerns. 149 In the
years following the "social promotion" vote, notwithstanding some limited
indications of success under mayoral control, 150 there has been ongoing
concern about the lack of inclusion of parental and public voices. These
concerns have led to public outcry at times. One such instance occurred
when the Chancellor, without prior notice or discussion, made an abrupt,
mid-year shift in school bus routes during the winter of 2007, and another
when he instituted a policy banning the use of cell phones in public
schools. 15 1 Both changes sparked strong vocal objections by parents and
other observers. This contentious opposition may have been avoided had
there been greater transparency and opportunity for comment, as well as
policy modification. In addition, the Department is undergoing its third
school re-structuring in the last six years. This move has drawn intense
criticism from parents and the public, as such community members fear
the continual changes in school administration and staff impede commu-
nication and the ability to obtain information and assistance.
Efforts to push the Mayor and Chancellor to include parental and
public input into the policymaking process have continued unabated since
the implementation of mayoral control. Recently, the Mayor and Chancel-
lor sought to respond to concerns raised by parents and community mem-
bers about their exclusion from policymaking, and the lack of
transparency in public school decision-making. For example, in early
2007, the Mayor and Chancellor announced the appointment of a Chief
Family Engagement Officer. This appointment came in response to pa-
rental concerns about their lack of essential information and inability to
participate in the school decision-making process. 1
52
149. For example, the Department of Education's perceived lack of response
to calls for class size reduction prompted an attempt in 2003 to pass a referendum
requiring class size reduction in city schools. The Mayor and the Chancellor
blocked the referendum and succeeded in fending off a court challenge to the
City Clerk's denial of a petition to place the class size reduction referendum on the
ballot. See Pena v. Robles, Index No. 111177/05, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19,
2006) (providing rationale for preventing referendum).
150. The Department of Education has touted modest increases in state-wide
test scores in some grades and a slight decline in dropout rates, results that should
be applauded but are not yet sufficiently longstanding to qualify as evidence of
sustainable improvement. See, e.g., N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., Schools Chancellor Klein
Announces Gains by New York City Eighth Grade Students on State English Language Arts
Exam, U.S. STATE NEWS, Sept. 21, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 23354926 (provid-
ing statistical figures).
151. See Elissa Gootman, A Week After Bus Changes, Parents' Complaints Continue,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at B2 (describing public reaction to Chancellor's actions);
Elissa Gootman, September in January: School Bus Changes Sow Confusion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2007, at Bi (same).
152. See Elissa Gootman, Hoping to Quiet Critics, Bloomberg Picks A Parent in Chief
for City's Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at B3 (describing appointment). The
Department of Education also issued a parent survey, seeking the views of parents
regarding the functioning of the public schools. See Mayor Bloomberg, Chancellor
Klein Unveil First-Ever Citywide Survey to Learn About Public Schools, U.S. STATE NEWS,
Apr. 30, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 8201344 (detailing survey).
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Thus, it appears as though the Mayor and Chancellor are beginning
to heed the call for greater transparency and inclusion of parental and
public input in school governance and policymaking. Whether these at-
tempts will result in significant improvement in parental and public partic-
ipation remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that there is a need to
address the shortcomings of the Panel for Educational Policy and the
CDECs in the context of mayoral control. These structures, which were
designed to include parental and public input, have become all but mori-
bund. Their ability to be revived should be a key consideration in deter-
mining whether the current mayoral control structure ought to be
retained.
Part of the problem with the range of reforms and differences in
views about the proper scope and limits of the powers, duties and appro-
priate roles of the respective participants in school governance lies in the
failure to identify the theory or theories of democratic participation under
which the school governance structure is operating. For example, school
governance reform measures granting mayoral control generally have not
been designed to give hierarchical or absolute authority to the Mayor. In
most instances, they contemplate something quite different. Though cer-
tainly designed to give the Mayor greater power and to provide for clearer
lines of accountability, most of the urban governance structures that have
shifted to mayoral control place it within a system of citywide, district and
school-based governance structures. These structures contemplate ongo-
ing involvement by many different stakeholders, and implicitly invoke a
theory of democratic participation that reflects a more deliberative ap-
proach. It appears, however, that in practice the various actors in the sys-
tem are operating under different theories of democratic participation.
The failure to name and address the appropriate democratic theory
threatens the proper functioning of the components of school govern-
ance. This omission also greatly harms the perceived and actual legiti-
macy and sustainability of the reforms put in place under mayoral control.
IV. THE OPERATION OF THEORIES OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN
PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE
At the heart of the differences between the practice of public school
governance by New York City's Mayor and Chancellor and the expecta-
tions of many community members lies a significant difference in the the-
ories of democratic participation at play. The Mayor and Chancellor, for
example, appear to take a minimalist view that mayoral control means just
that: unilateral decision-making authority by the Mayor, legitimated by the
fact of his popular election. Others view public school governance, even
under mayoral control, under a more deliberative and discursive model, as
requiring ongoing information-sharing, dialogue and deliberation, prior
to the implementation of policy changes affecting schools, students, par-
ents, communities and the city as a whole.
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
A. Overview of Theories of Democratic Participation1 53
As a general matter, some theorists view democratic participation as
requiring active, ongoing inclusion of the public in the process of collec-
tively exercising power.1 5 4 This view of democracy posits that to be legiti-
mate, democratic institutions and processes must be structured so that
decisions concerning the common interest result from "processes of col-
lective deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and equal
individuals. 155
Others view the legitimizing power of democracy more narrowly, as
stemming from the act of selecting democratic representatives, who are
then authorized to establish the rules necessary to the common endeavor.
Jfirgen Habermas identifies this notion as the liberal view that "democratic
will-formation has the exclusive function of legitimating the exercise of
political power. Election results are the license to assume governmental
power, whereas government must justify the use of power to the pub-
lic.' 56 He contrasts this with the republican view, under which "demo-
cratic will-formation has the significantly stronger function of constituting
society as a political community," in which the "government is not only
empowered to exercise a largely open mandate but also programmatically
committed to carry out certain policies. It remains bound to a self-gov-
erning political community."1 5 7 He goes on to note that discourse theory
adds a third idea that "the procedures and communicative presupposi-
tions of democratic opinion- and will-formation function as the most im-
portant sources for the discursive rationalization of the decisions of an
administration constrained by law and statute."15 8
Habermas's discourse theory provides perhaps the most complete
and overarching argument in favor of deliberative democracy. For
Habermas, the communicative action that precedes and provides the con-
153. This section references in broad outline the basic theories and structures
of democracy and democratic process. It is intended to provide a basic framework
rather than an exhaustive consideration of the myriad issues surrounding each
aspect and form of democracy. Thus, the discussion that follows may be placed
within that broader framework.
154. For example, Seyla Benhabib defines democracy as:
a model for organizing the collective and public exercise of power in ma-
jor institutions of a society on the basis of the principle that decisions
affecting the well-being of a collectivity can be viewed as the outcome of a
procedure of free and reasoned deliberation among individuals consid-
ered moral and political equals.
Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 68 (Seyla
Benhabib ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1996) (providing opinion on democratic
process).
155. See id. at 69 (same).
156. Jtirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 28, supra note 154.
157. Id.
158. Id.
[Vol. 53: p. 297
2008] PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY 327
text for the exercise of popular sovereignty is the legitimating force be-
hind democracy. Habermas does not separate democracy from human
rights, nor does he separate democratic discourse from higher moral or
"natural law" norms. Rather, Habermas takes the view that rational demo-
cratic discourse must permit legal consociates "to test whether a contested
norm can or could obtain to acquiescence of all those who might be
affected."1
59
Thus, while there is a shared, very general understanding of democ-
racy as "rule by the people" within the context of decision-making by ma-
jority vote, there are various theories about the degree of authority
granted to elected representatives, and the degree to which public input
and deliberation are required to legitimate the exercise of governmental
power. In structuring democratic processes and institutions, the difficulty
lies in satisfying the criteria for democracy under the operating theory,
while addressing its limitations and providing for a practical, functional
form of governance. To make sense of any democratic structure, it is nec-
essary to understand the underlying theory and ideals it seeks to achieve.
Indeed, much of the work in structuring democratic institutions is aimed
at bridging the gap between ideal democracy and political and social reali-
ties, while retaining the core objective of rule by the people. 160
Representative democracy, as understood today, 161 is designed to ad-
dress the difficulty in managing majority rule in large-scale societies.162
Because the kind of "primary" democracy practiced in ancient Greece on
the city-state level is too cumbersome in large-scale democracies with large
numbers of people dispersed geographically, representative democracy
159. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS-
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 134 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press
1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS]. He goes on to note:
"Thus, the desired internal connection between popular sovereignty and human
rights consists in the fact that the system of rights represents precisely those condi-
tions under which communication forms that are necessary for politically autono-
mous legislation can, in turn, be institutionalized." Id.; see also Angel R. Oquendo,
Deliberative Democracy in Habermas and Nino, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 196
(2002).
160. Perhaps the most difficult task in approaching the democratic ideal in-
volves the need to address social inequality and oppression by moving from a false
notion of interest group struggle that assumes equality and ignores subordination
and inequality based on race, sex, ethnicity and class. It is a particularly difficult
project today, when the influence of wealthy corporate interests combine with ris-
ing consumerism and the continuing marginalization, subordination and exploita-
tion of the poor and people of color. See generally CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY
MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM (Penguin Press 2004) (outlin-
ing and assessing possible pitfalls of democratic process).
161. It is important to note the view that "representative government
originated not as a democratic practice but as a device by which nondemocratic
governments-monarchs mainly-could lay their hands on precious revenues and
resources they wanted, particularly for fighting wars." ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DE-
MOCRACY 103 (Yale Univ. Press 1998).
162. See id. at 90 (describing modern, large scale, representative democratic
government as "polyarchal democracy").
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has developed as the most common governmental form today. 163 In the
United States, for example, the democratic constitutional design balances
majority rule with protections for minority and fundamental rights, and
avoids excessive concentration of power.
164
Thus, democracy is subject to a variety of interpretations within the
constitutional framework. 165 First, the republican form of government,
consisting of several branches that check and balance each other to pre-
serve minority rights, guards against corruption and tyranny. 166 The
Framers designed each branch of government-executive, legislative and
judicial-to function distinctly in preserving fundamental rights and a bal-
ance of power among majority and minority interests. 167 Second, federal-
ism represents the interests of municipalities, counties, states and the
nation as a whole, and incorporates competing ideas of democracy into a
workable governance structure.1 68 Federalism also features separated
powers, checks and balances with varying degrees of representation and
public input among the branches to accommodate basic democratic no-
tions of majority rule. 169 Thus, republican government provides a practi-
cal application of majority rule in a large, complex society while
163. See generally John Stuart Mill, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1972), re-
printed in THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 312-14 (Robert Dahl et al. eds. 2003) (pro-
fessing virtues of broad-based representative government); James Mill, ESSAY ON
GOVERNMENT (1819-1823), reprinted in DEMOCRACY- A READER 153-56 (Ricardo
Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds. 2000).
164. See generally Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Demo-
craticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 276 (1998) (stating Madisonian ideal
of limited, divided government within United States constitutional framework).
165. See id. at 274-76 (discussing deliberative versus "calculative" understand-
ings of democracy within relationship to American constitutional design). Doff &
Sabel note that:
For Madison, the rivalries and conflicts resulting from a division of pow-
ers between the states and the federal government, among the judicial,
executive, and legislative branches, and within the legislature, between
the more deliberative Senate and the more calculative House of Repre-
sentatives, would disorient and disorganize factional interests. This re-
sult, in turn, would reduce the chance that majorities could entrench
themselves at the expense of minorities so that any branch or level of
government could usurp the powers of others or the rights of citizens....
Constitutional review by a Supreme Court, still further removed from the
politics of do ut des, would defend the ideal of a deliberative republic in
those seldom instances where faction managed to rally itself despite the
impediments of constitutional design.
Id. at 276. (explaining how Madisonian ideal of divided government was first to
synthesize these views within United States constitutionalism).
166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (ames Madison) (arguing against aggrega-
tion of powers in single governmental branch); see also Robert A. Dahl, Madisonian
Democracy, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956), reprinted in THE DEMOCRACY
SOURCEBOOK 207-16 (Robert Dahl et al. eds., 2003).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 166 (arguing for
separation of powers).
168. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (outlining federalism and
separation of powers in United States Constitution).
169. As Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel observed:
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maintaining mechanisms for both local control and the protection of fun-
damental and minority rights. 170
All of democracy's structures operate within an economic class system
that dictates the degree of participation by particular individuals and
groups.1 71 Divisions along the lines of race, ethnicity and gender also im-
pact the degree and effectiveness of democratic participation.1 72 These
issues are relevant concerning the selection of governing leaders and de-
termining who is qualified to participate in the electoral and deliberative
processes.1 73
When considering democracy, even in its most basic forms, it is im-
portant to remember that participation in a democracy has historically
The genius of American constitutionalism has been its ability to synthe-
size and resynthesize, as circumstance demanded, two contrary under-
standings of democracy articulated at the time of the French and
American Revolutions. The first understanding is deliberative and aimed
at the good of all in abstraction from the diversity of everyday affairs. The
second is calculative, aimed at the good of each as measured by success in
the most diverse practical activities. The current impasse in constitu-
tional design derives from the limits of these underlying, mutually defin-
ing conceptions, not a misstep of synthesis; a fresh advance,
correspondingly, will depend on reconceptualizing deliberative demo-
cratic choice in relation to modern practical affairs.
Doff & Sabel, supra note 164, at 274-75.
170. In Habermas's view, "the organization of the constitutional state is ulti-
mately supposed to serve the politically autonomous self-organization of a commu-
nity that has constituted itself with the system of fights as an association of free and
equal consociates under law." HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note
159, at 176 (articulating vision for principles of constitutional state).
171. For a discussion of "economic inqeuality" and the role of relative wealth
in allowing or impeding meaningful democratic participation, see JAMES BOHMAN,
PUBLIC DELIBERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY 124-26 (MIT Press
1996). As Robert Dahl notes:
[W]e know that political activity, at least in the United States, is positively
associated to a significant extent with such variables as income, socio-eco-
nomic status, and education. . . . We now know that members of the
ignorant and unpropertied masses which Madison and his colleagues so
much feared are considerably less active politically than the educated and
well-to-do. By their propensity for political passivity the poor and unedu-
cated disenfranchise themselves. [Because] they also have less access
than the wealthy to the organizational, financial, and propaganda re-
sources that weigh so heavily in campaigns, elections, legislative, and ex-
ecutive decisions, anything like equal control over government policy is
triply barred to the members of Madison's unpropertied masses.
ROBERT A. DAHL, Polyarchal Democracy, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956),
reprinted in THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 52-53, supra note 166. Note the interrac-
tion between impoverished citizens' exclusion from political participation attrib-
uted to their passivity at the same time that structural barriers preventing their
participation in political processes are acknowledged. See id.
172. See, e.g., IRs MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 204-11 (Will
Kymlicka et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (arguing that racial and class segre-
gation generate structural inequalities resulting in democratic exclusion).
173. See, e.g., Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (1995), reprinted in DEMOC-
RACY: A READER 161-64 (Ricardo Blaug &John Schwartzmantel eds., 2000).
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been limited to those members of the society deemed eligible and "quali-
fied" to participate.1 74 The determination of who is qualified to govern
and who is qualified to participate in selecting governing representatives is
a persistent question that arises in various contexts concerning democratic
governance.' 75 Concerns and disputes over qualifications to govern date
to Plato's critique of democracy, which argued that societies would be best
governed by "platonic guardians" or expert philosophical rulers.176
Whether characterized as tension between "elites" and the masses, or sim-
ply framed as incompetence to participate, no democracy may be said to
have achieved the ideal goal of rule by the people.
As noted above, the practice of excluding certain groups from voting,
or any meaningful democratic participation, applied until very recently to
women, African Americans, Asians and others.' 77 The exclusion of such
groups from governance and decision-making persists today, and it often
continues to be cast in terms of qualification to govern or to partici-
pate.17 8 Exclusion also concerns the increasing role of wealth as a pre-
qualification to compete and participate meaningfully in the electoral
process. 179 The notion of "qualified participation" in the democratic pro-
174. As Robert Dahl starkly put it:
[I]n all democracies and republics throughout twenty-five centuries the
rights to engage fully in political life were restricted to a minority of
adults. "Democratic" government was government by males only-and
not all of them. It was not until the twentieth century that in both theory
and practice democracy came to require that the rights to engage fully in
political life must be extended, with very few if any exceptions, to the
entire population of adults permanently residing in a country.
DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY supra note 161, at 89-90 (chronicling history of underinclu-
sive democracy).
175. See ROBERTA. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CITICS 119-31 (Yale Univ. Press
1989) (setting forth examples of problems encountered in applying either require-
ment that all those governed be authorized to participate in democratic process as
well as problems associated with determining who is or is not qualified to
participate).
176. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book VI (G.P. Goold ed., Paul Shorey trans.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1970) (noting "whichever [of the philosophers and
nonphilosophers] appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society,
these we should establish as guardians"). This is similar to John Stuart Mill's
description of the "good despot." See Mill, supra note 163, at 312 ("The supposi-
tion is, that absolute power, in the hands of an eminent individual, would ensure a
virtuous and intelligent performance of all the duties of government.").
177. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (holding that
women's right to vote was not guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment Privileges
and Immunities Clause, despite women's constitutional status as "equal citizens"
with men).
178. See Furhman & Lazerson, supra note 7 (discussing association of citizen-
ship with public education as complicated by controversy over those eligible to be
citizens).
179. Indeed, the centrality of wealth in determining electoral outcomes
presents a serious threat to American democracy. See generally WEST, supra note
160.
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cess often informs the preferred theory and structure of democratic partic-
ipation across the spectrum: from deliberative to minimalist.
B. Deliberative Democracy
Much current discussion of democracy focuses on deliberative democ-
racy, 180 or a more participatory form of democracy, and the procedures,
institutions and structures necessary to maximize citizen participation in
democratic decision-making. 18 a Jfirgen Habermas's discourse theory ar-
gued that democratic legitimacy depends not simply upon majority rule,
but rather the nature of the communicative action that precedes decision-
making by a majority vote of free and equal consociates. Habermas ex-
plains that:
[T]he democratic procedure is institutionalized in discourses
and bargaining processes by employing forms of communication
that promise that all outcomes reached in conformity with the
procedure are reasonable. No one has worked out this view
more energetically than John Dewey: "Majority rule, just as ma-
jority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it
never is merely majority rule .... The means by which a majority
comes to be a majority is the more important thing: antecedent
debates, modification of views to meet the opinions of minori-
ties .... The essential need, in other words, is the improvement
of the conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion." Delib-
180. Adam Przeworski defines "deliberation" as,
[A] form of discussion intended to change the preferences on the bases
of which people decide how to act. Deliberation is "political" when it
leads to a decision binding on a community .... "[D]emocratic political
deliberation" occurs when discussion leads to a decision by voting. If a
dictator listens to a discussion and then makes a decision, deliberation is
political but not democratic.
Adam Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY 140 (Jon Elster ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (discussing ways in which
deliberation may be used to persuade people to vote against their own interests);
see also John D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 44,
supra at 63 (framing deliberative democracy as form of public discussion).
Przeworski noted that deliberation could be used to persuade people to vote
against their best interests. Id. at 141.
181. See, e.g., Tali Mendelberg, The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence, in
POLITICAL DECISION MAKING, DELIBERATION AND PARTICIPATION 153 (Michael X.
Delli Carpini et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-uchv/de-
lib/MendelbergDeliberativeCitizen.pdf. Mendelberg notes that there is:
no single definition on which all theorists of deliberation agree ...
Many theorists emphasize that during true deliberation, people rely on
reasons that speak to the needs or principles of everyone affected by the
matter at hand. The promise of deliberation is the ability to foster the
egalitarian, reciprocal, reasonable, and open-minded exchange of lan-
guage. The consequences, according to these theories, are a more em-
pathic view of the other.
Id. (illustrating variety of theories that support deliberative democracy).
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erative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive
structure of an opinion- and will-formation that can fulfill its so-
cially integrative function only because citizens expect its results
to have a reasonable quality. Hence, the discursive level of public
debates constitutes the most important variable.'
8 2
Jon Elster argues that deliberative democracy contemplates "collective
decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by the
decision of their representatives . . . the democratic part" and "decision
making by means of arguments offered by and to participants who are
committed to the values of rationality and impartiality ... the deliberative
part."' 83 Within the concept of deliberative democracy lies a range of
views about the degree of deliberation and appropriate mechanisms for
inclusion necessary to legitimize democratic governance. 18 4 For example,
various observers define deliberation by its outcome, or the change of
preferences as a result of deliberation;1 85 others focus on the features of
the deliberative process, from public discussion18 6 to a more involved
form of public "free reasoning among equals."'
18 7
Moreover, some scholars address the need to include historically si-
lenced or marginalized individuals and groups and represent differences
in democratic discourse and decision-making.' 8 8 Several theorists argue
that effective participation depends upon social equality more than politi-
cal or governance structures, or constitutional design, on either the cen-
tralized or local level. 18 9 Thus, equality and efficacy of participation
182. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTs AND NORMS, supra note 159, at 304 (pro-
fessing importance of democratic processes in democratic decision-making).
183. See, e.g.,Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8 (Jon Elster
ed., 1998) (noting overlap among various definitions of deliberative democracy
concerning collective decision-making by those affected by decision or their
representatives).
184. See id. (noting widely divergent definitions of deliberative democracy
among scholars).
185. See, e.g., Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DE-
MOCRAY 123-24 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (focusing on outcomes of deliberation in
United States and noting instances where "deliberation induces preferences that
appear to be more in line with the interests of the communicator than with those
of recipients of the messages communicated").
186. See, e.g., Fearon, supra note 180, at 63 (describing deliberation either as
type of discussion or interior process to weigh reasons concerning action).
187. Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185,
193 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (arguing that deliberative interpretation of democracy
links exercise of power with "free reasoning among equals").
188. See, e.g., Carol Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 171
(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (arguing for greater participation in decision-making
process); Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), reprinted in
DEMOCRACY: A READER, supra note 173, at 165-68.
189. See, e.g., Bohman, supra note 171, at 111 (arging that political inequality
in deliberation affects democratic legitimacy).
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depend upon the existence of certain minimal social and economic
prerequisites.
Critiques by socialist and communist theorists, who identified capital-
ism and its socioeconomic exclusion of the masses as antithetical to de-
mocracy, identified such deliberative deficiencies. 190 Indeed, among the
critiques of deliberative democracy is the claim that the existence of social
inequality makes true deliberation impossible and that the false promise
of deliberation on unequal terms serves to mask and reinforce inequal-
ity. 19 1 To work, these theorists argue, a deliberative democracy must ad-
dress social inequalities and power dynamics that impede equal
participation in deliberation.
192
Critical race and LatCrit theorists emphasize two relevant ideals.
19 3
First, they advocate incorporating anti-subordination principles into dem-
ocratic practice and confronting the impact of inequality based upon race,
sex, class and other categories of historic oppression and political and so-
cial exclusion. 194 Second, they support the incorporation of anti-subordi-
nation principles into democratic practice. 195  Under this view,
"[d]emocracy is the anti-subordination perspective., 1 9 6 Inclusive and
meaningful deliberative democracy is only truly possible when society real-
izes equality among participants by eliminating structures and practices of
subordination.
Whether broadly or narrowly defined, or primarily focused on out-
comes, process or equality of participation, deliberative democracy gener-
ally contemplates the ongoing substantive involvement of the governed in
the decision-making process by elected leaders. 197 Promoters of delibera-
tive democracy view the public as more engaged, and qualified to engage,
190. See, e.g., Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, reprinted in DEMOCRACY: A
READER at 242-43; Vladimir Ilich Lenin, The State and Revolution (1917), reprinted in
DEMOCRACY: A READER, supra note 173, at 244-47.
191. See, e.g., Mendelberg, supra note 181, at 165-67 (giving examples of delib-
erative democratic situations with pervasive inequality).
192. See, e.g., YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 172, at 53-54
(identifying external and internal exclusion concems confronting modern
democracies).
193. See Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical
Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENY. U. L. REv. 329, 336-38 (2006) (explain-
ing Critical Race Theory's goal of liberating minorities and socially subordinated
groups, and LatCrit's conscious articulation of antisubordination against all forms
of oppression).
194. See id. (same).
195. See id. (same).
196. See Max J. Castro, Democracy in Anti-Subordination Perspective: Local/Global
Intersections: An Introduction, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 863, 863 (1999) ("[D]emocracy is
a horizon not yet reached anywhere and a powerful idea to be deployed in the
anti-subordination struggles of the coming century.").
197. See generally HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs, supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
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in voting, lawmaking and policy development.19 8 Habermas's discourse
theory goes even further, linking the very legitimacy of democratic institu-
tions with the meaningful inclusion of the governed in the process of mak-
ing laws.19 9
C. The Minimalist View: Authority of the Elected Representative
Against this more inclusive, and arguably more idealized, version of
democracy, some theorists focus on the need for limits on the permissible
degree of deliberation in order to facilitate more efficient decision-mak-
ing.200 For example, Jane Mansfield argues that in any well-functioning
democracy, "coercion must play a large, valuable, and relatively legitimate
role. ' '20 1 Such coercion, in her view, ensures the resolution of matters
over which there are differences of opinion and avoids having governance
remain mired in the status quo based upon a failure to achieve consen-
sus. 2 0 2 She notes many instances in which the power of the state is exer-
cised with something less than full deliberation, and consensus and
acceptance by the citizenry almost as a cost of doing business. 20 3 There is
a realization that many issues cannot, and will not, be resolved through
deliberation. When "conflict remains after good deliberation, a democ-
racy has two choices-to remain at the status quo, or to act, by coercing
some to go along with others."20 4 While observing the existence, utility
and even legitimacy of the use of coercion in democracies, Mansfield em-
phasizes that a robust means of combating coercion is just as necessary to
effective democracy as the use of coercion. 20 5 She states that the public
must maintain a balance between letting "reasonably just coercion do its
good work of helping organize social arrangements" while retaining the
198. See Gould, supra note 188, at 171 (describing, then critiquing,
Habermas's public sphere discourse); Benhabib, supra note 154, at 68 (advancing
"free and reasoned dilberation among individuals" who are "political equals" as
basis for functioning democracy); Mendelberg, supra note 181, at 151-52 (noting
that scholars and practioners are calling for more public participation in bureau-
cratic governance and greater civility in political discussions).
199. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs, supra note 159, at 307 (articu-
lating informal processes of opinion-formation).
200. See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in
THE DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 15-16 (Robert Dahl et al. eds., 2003) (advocating
benefits of even minimalist conception of democracy in resolving conflicting politi-
cal forces through voting rather than by violence).
201. See Jane Mansfield, Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE 46, supra note 154 (explaining that democracies need coercion in
addition to deliberation).
202. See id. at 47 (noting that democracies need coercion to avoid being stuck
in status quo).
203. See id. at 56 (noting inherent inequalities that produce coercive deci-
sions).
204. Id. at 47 (discussing need for coercion in democracies).
205. See id. at 56 (noting that democracies can fight coercion and use it at
same time).
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ability to effectively critique such coercion and to act against it when it
becomes intolerably unfair and unjust.20 6
Other theorists go well beyond Mansfield's observation of the role
coercion plays in a democracy, and argue in favor of an authoritarian form
of democracy where participation by the masses is limited to selecting
qualified leaders who are authorized to rule on behalf of the populace. 20 7
On this view, only very few people are and should be qualified to make
decisions and to rule in a democracy. 20 8 Such a view eschews the notion
of deliberative democracy or consensus building to serve the common
good or the will of the people. 20 9 Instead, it posits that the democratic
process begins and ends with the selection of a leader or leaders who are
given the authority and legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of the
people.2 1
0
For example, Joseph Schumpeter views democracy simply as a compe-
tition for political leadership.2 1 1 He critiques the classical theory of de-
mocracy's focus on the will of the people as disconnected from the true
experience of democratic governance. 2 12 In his view, there is no "com-
mon good" or "common will" of the people.21 3 Therefore, it is up to polit-
ical leadership to make decisions in a roughly representative way on
matters about which there will likely be disagreement. 2 14 Schumpeter has
argued that the typical citizen has neither the interest nor knowledge to
participate effectively in government affairs.2 1 5 He considers the idea that
ordinary citizens have the wherewithal to participate effectively to be a
206. See id. (discussing good and bad deriving from coercion).
207. See, e.g., PLATO, supra note 176 (discussing belief that only select few are
fit to rule); Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (1984), reprinted in DEMOC-
RAcv: A READER 274-77 (Ricardo Blaug & John Schwarzmantel eds., 2000) (discuss-
ing small group of established candidates from which voters choose); see also Roger
Soder, Democracy, Do We Really Want It?, in THE PUBLIC PURPOSE OF PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION AND SCHOOLING 89 (John I. Goodlad & Timothy J. McMannon eds., 1997)
(discussing view of many "academicians, politicians, foundation people, and power
brokers throughout the country who do not have, at heart, very much faith at all in
the notion that 'the people shall judge"').
208. See, e.g., Scruton, supra note 207, at 276 (discussing paradox between ac-
cepting as legimate government composed of democratically elected representa-
tives, and electing representatives to serve in government from parties established
independently of the electorate).
209. See id. (same).
210. See id. at 276 (arguing that representation of constituents ceases upon
election into legislative body).
211. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOC-
RACY 3 (Harper Perennial 1950) (dismissing popular but unrealistic ideas of
democracy).
212. See id. at 253, 263 (arguing that individual rational will is unrealistic be-
cause political process actually manufactures public's will).
213. See id. at 251-52 (stating that common good means different things to
different groups and this prevents common will from forming).
214. See id. at 252 (arguing that common will does not exist).
215. See id. at 260-61 (explaining that reduced sense of responsibility and lack
of long-term interest leads to irrational political choices).
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myth. 2 16 This is because most citizens are primarily concerned with their
own immediate affairs and do not feel a sense of responsibility for what are
perceived to be more distant affairs of government.2 17 This disconnected-
ness, in his view, becomes more pronounced as governance moves away
from local politics having more meaningful effects on citizens' lives. 218
Because most people do not feel responsibility for broader affairs of gov-
ernment, Schumpeter questions their ability to participate in such govern-
ance, because "without the initiative that comes from immediate
responsibility, ignorance will persist in the face of masses of information
however complete and correct."2 19
D. Centralized Control Versus "All Politics Is Local"
As noted above, an important consideration in theories about struc-
tures for appropriate democratic participation is whether governance is
operating centrally in a manner affecting a large population, or if it is
operating more locally with respect to a smaller "polis." There is generally
a greater opportunity for meaningful public participation in small local
entities versus large centralized government structures.
Notions of degrees of public participation in democracy must take
into account the various structures of government. For example, the mini-
malist view of an elected leader authorized to make decisions unilaterally
216. See id. (stating that classic ideas of public participation in democracy fall
apart once issues become complex).
217. See id. at 261 (explaining that voters show interest only in issues that
directly affect them).
218. See id. at 260-61 (discussing loss of interest as political topics have more
indirect effect on citizens).
219. Id. See id. at 262 (stating that impatience and lack of interest prevents
attempts to grasp difficult political information). Of course, the most extreme ver-
sion of the authoritarian view of government makes the direct argument that the
masses cannot effectively govern, not even by majority vote. This is not democracy,
but fascism. Mussolini's fascist critique of democracy states this premise head on:
Fascism denies that the majority, through the mere fact of being a major-
ity, can rule human societies; it denies that this majority can govern by
means of periodical consultation; it affirms the irremediable, fruitful and
beneficent inequality of men, who cannot be leveled by such a mechani-
cal and extrinsic fact as universal suffrage. By democratic regimes we
mean those in which from time to time the people is given the illusion of
being sovereign, while true effective sovereignty lies in other, perhaps ir-
responsible and secret, forces.
Benito Mussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism, in DEMOCRACY, A READER, supra note 173,
at 278. Mussolini goes on to argue that, were it to give the lie to its pretensions of
egalitarianism, "Fascism could be defined as an 'organized, centralized, authorita-
rian democracy."' Id. at 279 (discussing conceptions of fascism). While Musso-
lini's characterization ought to be, and generally is, rejected out of hand, it can be
instructive by providing a clear benchmark of what democracy is not. It can also
help identify the places on the spectrum of thought about the degree to which
collective deliberation and inclusion are necessary and central to a meaningful
definition of participatory democracy. This is particularly true with respect to
more authoritarian or minimalist views of democracy.
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fits most squarely with the role of the executive: the president, governor or
mayor. The legislative structure, by contrast, appears to be designed with
a more deliberative process in mind.220 While there is an argument that
either a minimalist or deliberative view of democracy vis-ls-vis the general
public may be applied to all elective institutions of government, the exis-
tence of a mixed structure, designed to represent majorities and minori-
ties in configurations both large and small, may be viewed as an attempt to
balance the benefits and drawbacks of each model, and to encourage de-
liberation by requiring dialogue among disparate branches and levels of
government.
2 2
'
Within the mixed structure of government we see different prefer-
ences for a strong executive or a strong legislature, as well as much discus-
sion about the appropriate role of the courts.2 22 Recent trends appear to
have moved in the direction of a strong executive. On the federal level,
the presidency of George W. Bush has pushed the notion of executive
power and the unitary executive to an extreme rarely seen before. 223 On
the state and local levels, increased executive power also appears to be in
ascendance. 224 Centralized control of public schools may be viewed as
part of this trend. A preference for a strong executive often relates to
notions of expertise, efficiency and accountability, and to the idea that
democracy and governance are messy, unwieldy and best left in the hands
of chosen experts.
220. Although some argue that the legislative process, particularly in the
House or the Assembly, involves more "horse trading" than deliberation, and
leaves little room for substantive input.
221. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison) (addressing mixed
structural design of government); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITu-
TION 23 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (discussing Framers' view of deliberative gov-
ernment as one limited by checks and balances that forced discussions). Indeed,
the Madisonian vision of divided government was designed to diminish the role of
factionalism and self-interest to allow room for substantive deliberation. Id. at 22;
see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 164, at 276 (suggesting democratic model with
decentralized power that will maximize information sharing through regional and
national coordinating organizations).
222. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Author-
ity: The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 871
(2007) (identifying and examining traits of new Bushian Presidency). Indeed, the
Bush II Administration demonstrates a presidential term that began with efforts to
extend presidential power in unprecedented ways. These attempts were met with
an electoral defeat of the Republican Party during the 2006 mid-term elections
and ongoing congressional opposition, particularly as relates to the administra-
tion's conduct of the Iraq War. See id. at 874 (noting that current presidency is
more powerful than any recent presidency).
223. See, e.g., Melissa K. Matthews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examina-
tion of President Bush's New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'V 455
(2002) (discussing separation of powers debate with regard to unilateral action
president may take and effect of new presidential emergency powers).
224. See generally David J. Barron, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Gover-
nors, Presidents, and the Rule of Law, 115 YALE L.J. 215 (2006) (discussing cities'
ability to challenge laws as unconstitutional to preserve and expand local poli-
cymaking power).
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The degree of participation in a democracy is related to the particular
democratic structure, such as representative, direct or constitutional. 225
Participation also depends on the theory of democracy employed. 226 Pop-
ular theories range from the minimalist notion of the democratic election
of a leader who is then given authority to make decisions on behalf of the
populace, to theories of deliberative democracy that envision active ongo-
ing public involvement in policymaking, and various degrees of participa-
tion in between. 227
Critics of the contemporary minimalist view note the educative and
positive functions of participatory democracy, as well as its greater efficacy
in smaller, more local populations. 228 This is a particularly pertinent
question in the context of school governance, which in the United States
began as an essentially local enterprise, 2 29 but has increasingly become a
matter of centralized city, 230 state 23 1 and even federal 2 32 control. Even as
oversight and control of public schools occurs to a greater extent on the
federal and state levels, there remains a potent tradition of local involve-
ment. Indeed, a key question in determining the degree of public partici-
pation in public school governance has to do with the relative degrees of
decision-making taking place on the local, state and federal levels.
233
Overall, the public school system is designed as a mixed system, in part as
225. See Ilya Somin, "Active Liberty" and Judicial Power: What Should Courts Do To
Promote Democracy?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1827 (2006) (detailing democratic struc-
tures and their respective impact on political participation).
226. See id. at 1833 (discussing contested nature of democratic participation).
227. See id. at 1834 (noting range of competing theories of participation).
228. See Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, in THE DEMOC-
RACY SOURCEBOOK, supra note 166 at 41-47 (advancing idea that participatory de-
mocracy functions to educate and integrate populace into politics).
229. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (noting that "[n]o
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over
the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to
[the] quality of the educational process."); see alsoJaroslav Pelikan, General Introduc-
tion: The Public Schools as an Institution of American Democracy, in THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS XV (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2005)
(" [T] he mysterious process between child and teacher remains a prime documen-
tation of the frequently quoted maxim of the former House Speaker Thomas P.
("Tip") O'Neill that 'all politics is local'-and, one could add, so is public
education.").
230. For a discussion of city control of school governance, see supra notes 7-9
and 71 and accompanying text.
231. See Kirst, supra note 13, at 27 (noting that greater federal involvement in
education resulted in expansion of state education agencies and their capacity to
intervene in local school affairs).
232. For a discussion of the federal No Child Left Behind Act's imposition of
specific requirements on states, and thus local school districts, with little opportu-
nity for input from local communities, reflecting an unprecedented degree of fed-
eral involvement in public school policymaking, see supra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of increasing federal and state roles in public school
governance and policy setting, see supra notes 22-49 and accompanying text.
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a consequence of a history of local, state and federal involvement in vari-
ous configurations, and in part presumably with the hope of including the
benefits of both centralized control and local deliberation. 2 34 In the
school governance context, the tradition has been toward local control.2 35
The increasing role of federal and state governments as opposed to
local school boards in setting educational policy and driving education
governance is partly responsible for increased concern about the role of
public input and public participation in education discourse, particularly,
though not exclusively, on the local level. 236 As acknowledged by the say-
ing "all politics is local," the place for the greatest degree of participation,
input and democratic deliberation is generally at the local level. It is im-
portant to ask what we seek from a public school governance structure,
whether local or centralized, and what we hope to achieve through public
participation in public school governance.
Habermas's discourse theory of democracy draws a connection be-
tween legal institutions and the lifeworld, and demonstrates not only the
possibility, but the necessity, of inclusive communicative action to support
democratic legitimacy. For Habermas, democratic legitimacy stems from
rational discourse among free and equal legal consociates. 23 7 That dis-
course takes place within the context of the lifeworld. 238 "[T] he lifeworld,
of which institutions form a part, comes into view as a complex of inter-
penetrating cultural traditions, social orders, and personal identities."
239
The experience of the lifeworld thus includes the local everyday experi-
ence of members of the society together with broader, overarching social
norms and customs. Habermas notes that the lifeworld begins as "back-
ground," but must be foregrounded if communicative action and rational
discourse are to be more effective. 240 This concept of identifying and
234. For a discussion of the history of state and federal involvement in public
school configurations, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
235. For a discussion regarding the trend toward local school governance, see
supra notes 7, 11 and 71 and accompanying text.
236. For a discussion of federal and state involvement in setting education
policy, see supra notes 22-49 and accompanying text.
237. See HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRms, supra note 159, at 176
(describing source of democratic legitimacy).
238. See id. at 22 (detailing arena in which rational discourse between legal
consociates takes place).
239. See id. at 23 (describing nature of lifeworld).
240. See id. at 22-23 (describing optimal function of lifeworld). As Habermas
puts it:
As we engage in communicative action, the lifeworld embraces us as an
unmediated certainty, out of whose immediate proximity we live and
speak. This all-penetrating, yet latent and unnoticed presence of the
background of communicative actions can be described as a more intense
yet deficient form of knowledge and ability. To begin with, we make use
of this knowledge involuntarily, without reflectively knowing that we pos-
sess it at all. What enables ... and even augments its epistemic quality
from a subjective standpoint, is precisely the property that robs it of a
constitutive feature of knowledge: we make use of such knowledge with-
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foregrounding lifeworld experience as a necessary component of effective
communicative action has particular salience in the context of public
school governance. In this context, given social and economic disparities
among those affected by school governance policy, as well as the relation-
ship between education and understanding of the lifeworld, the place-
ment of communicative action in the context of the lifeworld promotes
the legitimacy of governance and decision-making.
E. Public Participation in Public School Governance as Connecting Law and
Policy to Lifeworld?
Much of the discussion of public schooling as a local endeavor re-
sponsive to particular community needs, as well as the necessity of public
education to maintain a locally distinct common culture, resonates with
Habermas's notion of lifeworld and its connection to legitimate demo-
cratic discourse and action. From this perspective, a central purpose of
public participation in public education is the connection of public
schools to the lifeworld, thus ensuring effective communicative action that
legitimizes public school policy.
A relationship is often drawn between the purpose of public educa-
tion to ensure informed participation in the democratic process, and the
importance of community involvement in public education policymaking.
For example, as the Supreme Court noted in Grutter v. Bollinger
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of
preparing students for work and citizenship, describing educa-
tion as pivotal to "sustaining our political and cultural heritage"
with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.
This Court has long recognized that "education ... is the very
foundation of good citizenship.2 41
out the awareness that it could be false. Insofar as all knowledge is fallible
and is known to be such, background knowledge does not represent
knowledge at all, in a strict sense. As background knowledge, it lacks the
possibility of being challenged, that is, of being raised to the level of criti-
cizable validity claims. One can do this only by converting it from a re-
source into a topic of discussion, at which point-just when it is
thematized-it no longer functions as a lifeworld background but rather
disintegrates in its background modality.
Id. (describing interaction between communicative action and lifeworld); see also
Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Habermas's Theory of Lawv, 23 CARDOzo L. REv.
473, 507-18 (2002) (for description and critique of Habermas's conception and
treatment of lifeworld in context of his communicative action theory).
241. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting opinion of Court); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
[Vol. 53: p. 297
2008] PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY 341
Thus, there is a notion that public education as an enterprise is
closely related to the development of citizens prepared to participate in
democratic society. Such a notion lends itself to the idea that the public as
a whole has an interest in determining the course of public education. 24 2
Discussions of democratic education tend to focus on deliberative democ-
racy. The idea that a major goal of public education is to prepare young
people to participate actively as informed citizens contemplates a form of
democracy that involves affirmative, substantive and ongoing citizen
participation. 2
43
But there is also a general view that more specific decisions about
curriculum, pedagogy and school administration should be made by edu-
cation experts, and not through a broader deliberative process. The func-
tion of public participation in school governance is therefore often viewed
as necessarily limited. It is not intended to determine particular curricular
or administrative choices, but rather to set the broad outline of educa-
tional policy in a manner that is acceptable to parents and to the public at
large. As Amy Guttman puts it:
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust nor-
mally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. (quoting opinion of Court).
242. SeeJOHN DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 87 (Free Press 1944):
The devotion of democracy to education is a familiar fact. The superfi-
cial explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage can-
not be successful unless those who elect and who obey their governors are
educated. Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external
authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and interest;
these can be created only by education. But there is a deeper explana-
tion. A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The
extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an
interest so that each has to refer his own action to that of others, and to
consider the action of others to given point and direction to his own, is
equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, and na-
tional territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their
activity.
Id. (describing role of education in democracy); see also Martha Minow, Reforming
School Reform, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 257, 270 (1999) ("[A] basic statement of public
school purposes would include forging commonality, promoting civic engagement
in a diverse and democratic nation, and offering quality opportunities on an equal
basis.").
243. See AMY GUTrMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11 (Princeton Univ. Press
1999) (discussing democratic deliberations by citizens as integral to democratic
education); Donna H. Kerr, Toward a Democratic Rhetoric of Schooling, in THE PUBLIC
PURPOSES OF EDUCATION AND SCHOOLING 82 (John I. Goodlad & Timothy J.
McMannon eds.,Jossey-Bass 1997) (concluding that schools have chance to foster
substance of democracy if adults become more involved in developing student
character and soul).
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The primary aim of a democratic theory of education is not to
offer solutions to all the problems plaguing our educational insti-
tutions, but to consider ways of resolving those problems that are
compatible with a commitment to democratic values. A demo-
cratic theory of education provides principles that, in the face of
our social disagreements, help us judge (a) who should have the
authority to make decisions about education, and (b) what the
moral boundaries of that authority are. 244
Even within the context of an admittedly deliberative process, there
are different views regarding the role that public participation should play
in shaping and legitimizing democratic decision-making. Some view pub-
lic participation in school governance as involving an educative and advi-
sory role but no real decision-making role. On this view, public
participation is primarily for the purpose of obtaining information and
providing commentary that may be accepted or ignored by the leadership.
It may take the form of a town hall meeting or advisory board.
Others view meaningful public participation as requiring some form
of decision-making authority, whether it is the requirement of an approval
before a policy may be adopted, or the ability to vote for a particular
course of action. 245 Still others view public participation more broadly as
intended to foster community-based strategies for school improvement, to
focus attention on particular issues facing community schools and to advo-
cate for solutions to those problems. These ideas resonate with
Habermas's notion of the necessity of foregrounding and connecting com-
municative action and democratic discourse to the lifeworld, to support
the legitimacy of decisions about the substantive values and procedural
processes governing public education. Viewed under Habermas's idea of
democratic legitimacy, and for purposes of building citizen capacity, pub-
lic discourse and deliberation ought to play a key role in determining the
broad contours of each of these kinds of decisions.
Another question that arises is whether there is an important public
role in broader educational policymaking or whether public participation
should be limited to the very local level, such as parent associations, school
leadership teams and local school boards. The history of public education
has long involved a tug-of-war between the tradition of local control of
schools, which involved greater participation by local "lay" people, versus a
more centralized apparatus governed by powerful elites or technocrats. 24 6
Throughout, questions regarding who should be involved in and control
decisions ranging from curriculum to standards to procedures for poli-
cymaking repeatedly arise. The response to these questions involves an
244. Id.
245. For a discussion of public participation in democratic decision-making,
see supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., GuTrmAN, supra note 243, at 73 (discussing extremes of full local
school board control of education and centralized national control).
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identification of the various "publics" that are assembled or structured in
school governance and an articulation of the respective roles these "pub-
lics" are meant to play. 247
While the possibilities for, and degrees of, public participation tend
to diminish the further decision-making strays from the local level, there
exists a role for deliberation and for public participation at every level. As
noted below, public school governance and policymaking take place on
the federal and state as well as the local level, and public education policy
is increasingly being driven by federal and state policy, and left to be im-
plemented on the local level. Assuming there is a role for public participa-
tion at every level of public education policymaking, what mechanisms for
structuring that participation will best serve the interests in having all rele-
vant voices heard, while also permitting the appropriate use of expertise
and allowing for the efficient implementation of education policy? Vari-
ous models of public school governance have been established and have
evolved over time, contributing to the current multi-layered structure of
public education.
F. Devolved Centralization or "Coordinated Decentralization ": Models of
Empowered Participatory Governance and a New Accountability
Perhaps the framing of school governance as either centralized or de-
centralized, or as all-minimalist or all-deliberative misses the point. It may
be that governance should be viewed as taking elements of both models
and structuring various "publics" to achieve the appropriate balance in
terms of deliberative discourse, decision-making authority and substantive
accountability.
Given the history of school governance, shifting from local to central-
ized control and back again, the tendency has been to think of governance
structures as either centrally or locally focused. Some forms of govern-
ance however, are developing in cities under mayoral control that include
elements of centralized control as well as mechanisms for local involve-
ment and innovation. Emerging from the perceived shortcomings of both
is a view of participatory governance that, while privileging local involve-
ment and deliberation, retains some of the benefits of centralized over-
sight and accountability.
Archon Fung and Eric Olin Wright have explored both the theory
and practical application of what they call "empowered participatory de-
mocracy" on the local level in a variety of settings. Such include school
governance in Chicago under a mixed centralized and localized govern-
ance structure. 24 8 Fung and Wright describe empowered participatory de-
247. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 272 (discussing formation of
"new publics" participating in school governance and benefits and drawbacks of
different configurations of these "publics" for ensuring meaningful and fruitful
engagement in public school governance).
248. See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered Par-
ticipatory Governance, in DEEPENING DEMOcRACY 35, 7-9 (Verso 2003) (describing
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mocracy as an empirical response to the "erosion of democratic vitality"
that is "an inevitable result of complexity and size." 249 This response seeks
to "develop transformative democratic strategies that can advance our
traditional values-egalitarian social justice, individual liberty combined
with popular control over collective decisions, community and solidarity,
and the flourishing of individuals in ways which enable them to realize
their potentials."250 Fung and Wright's conception of empowered par-
ticipatory governance involves reforms that are designed "to [press] the
values of participation, deliberation, and empowerment to the apparent
limits of prudence and feasibility."2 51 The reforms are "participatory be-
cause they rely upon the commitment and capacities of ordinary people to
make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation and empowered
because they attempt to tie action to discussion." 25 2
change in Chicago schools from "top-heavy, hierarchical" system to decentralized
system that "shifted power and control from centralized city-wide headquarters to
the individual schools themselves"). Fung & Wright also note however that the
shift evolved to include mechanisms for capacity building on local level and ac-
countability provisions that included centralized supervision. Id.; see also Archon
Fung, Deliberative Democracy, Chicago Style: Grass-roots Governance in Policing and Public
Education, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY 111, 119-20 (discussing decentralization re-
forms). It is important to note that "decentralization" has different meanings: de-
centralization of oversight and policymaking versus administrative decentralization
of schools. Several mayoral control structures combine centralized policymaking
and oversight with administrative decentralization, placing day-to-day operations
decisions at the school level. See, e.g., Deborah M. McGriff, Decentralization: Why,
How, and Toward What Ends?, NCREL POLICY BRIEFS (1993), http://www.ncrel.org/
sdrs/areas/issues/envrnmnt/go/93-1mcgr.htm (discussing evolution of decentral-
ization in Detroit public schools and continuing controversy). Administrative de-
centralization appears to be what is contemplated by the New York City
Chancellor's third reorganization of the schools since mayoral control. See David
M. Herszenhorn, Klein Specifies Restructuring of City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/nyregion/17schools.html
?-r=1&scp= 128&sq= %22david+m.+herszenhorn &st=nyt&oref=slogin (discussing
Bloomberg administration's restructuring of city schools). That reorganization
seeks to provide for "bottom up" versus "top down" administration of schools. Id.
(describing plan for restructuring).
249. See Fung & Wright, supra note 248, at 4 (discussing need for transforma-
tive democratic strategies).
250. See id. (discussing possible solution to erosion of democratic vitality).
251. See id. at 5 (discussing concepts in empowered participatory govern-
ance).
252. See id. (describing how participatory democracy can deepen average citi-
zen's influence in politics). Chicago schools added additional reform in 1995, im-
posed over the 1988 legislation. The 1995 reforms established a corporate-style
management system directly under the mayor's authority. The goals of the reform
were: (1) to relegitimize the public schools by creating a system of accountability in
which the mayor became ultimately responsible for the schools; (2) to attract mid-
dle class families back into the city to expand the city's economic base by improv-
ing the schools; and (3) to improve outcomes through a standardized student
accountability process. The 1995 reform eliminated the central school board and
the superintendent positions, and placed the school management under the au-
thority of the Reform Board of Trustees appointed by the mayor.
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This approach resonates with a Habermasian notion of discourse the-
ory of law and democracy and his idea of communicative action connect-
ing law to the lifeworld. The elements of empowered participatory
democracy include (1) placement of these ideas in a practical setting that
tests both possibilities and limitations of the approach on specific tangible
problems; (2) involvement of ordinary people affected by these problems;
and (3) deliberative solution generation. 253 These forms of empowered
participatory governance may take place in connection with centralized
accountability.
In another example of a mixed governance structure that seeks to
incorporate both robust participation and clear accountability, Leibman
and Sabel describe a form of "new accountability" in public school govern-
ance as designed based on a similar model of devolved responsibility and
autonomy coupled with the imposition of centralized standards and ac-
countability measures. 2 54 In this structure, standards and accountability
are set centrally by state and federal actors, yet are defined broadly
enough to allow room for experimentation and innovation at the local
level. 255 This top down policy and standard setting structure is coupled
with a bottom-up structure. Such coupling allows for reforms and innova-
tions that give teachers the discretion to implement effective learning ap-
proaches. It also allows for the formation of learning communities with
their colleagues in which novice teachers learn from more experienced
teachers, and students are engaged in instruction that is tailored to their
needs. 256 Liebman and Sabel discuss the school district as an "accounta-
ble learning community." They cite Anthony Alvarado's model of "a col-
legium of like-minded principals, each accountable for improving
instruction in his or her own school and able to guide and learn from the
others. The goal became to create 'a learning community' that con-
nected, and thus opened up to each other, the classroom, the school, and
the district."
257
Liebman and Sabel also consider the role of organizing and collective
action in supporting structural reforms that allow for both centralized ac-
253. See id. at 15 (sketching out three general principles of empowered par-
ticipatory governance).
254. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 207 (describing accountability
system that compares teacher's clinical practice with peer performance).
255. See id. (discussing state and national educational reform movements).
256. See id. at 214 (discussing professional educator reform movement).
257. See id. at 217 (quoting Alvarado's explanation of his model). This is a
model that the New York State Board of Regents is moving toward; trying to main-
tain gains achieved through standards and accountability measures while allowing
local innovation within an accountability scheme focused on outcomes rather than
centralized mandates. See New York State Board of Regents, P-16 EDUCATION: A
PLAN FOR ACTION (2006), available at http://usny.nysed.gov/summit/p-16ed.htm
(discussing educational challenges facing New York and laying out goals for
future).
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countability and local innovation. 258 In that context, they address the role
that "new publics," formed by coalitions of stakeholders from disparate
quarters who are disaffected by entrenched failures in public schooling,
play in fostering new governance structures. They address both top down
and bottom up changes necessary to ensure standards and accountability,
while allowing for tailoring and innovation. 259 These new publics, many
of which formed as a result of organizing around school funding litiga-
tion, create allies from among system insiders frustrated with failure, advo-
cacy organizations and local parent groups concerned with improving
educational quality.260 These coalitions show promise in effectuating
needed reform, because they understand the need to respond to both
"public" and "expert" opinion in fashioning solutions. 26 1 In other words,
they recognize the need to meet both substantive and democratic legiti-
macy in shaping and implementing school reform at both the central pol-
icy level and at the local implementation level.
The "new accountability" discussed by Liebman and Sabel envisions a
centralized system of standards and accountability general enough to al-
low for robust local innovation and improvement. 262 In this model, they
recognize the need to ensure robust participation on the local level:
"[p]arents and others must have the political capacity, rooted in and re-
sponsive to the needs of their communities, to challenge attempts at re-
centralization or power grabs by professionals or resurgent local
oligarchs." 263
While Liebman and Sabel acknowledge the need to include parents
and local community members in local reform coalitions, they seem to
underestimate the need to ensure sufficient capacity building to permit
sustained and effective participation by parents and community members.
They also gloss over the problematic power dynamics that exist in local
communities, particularly those engaged in school governance, including
the role of race and class in amplifying some voices while silencing others.
As many theorists of deliberative democracy have observed, the quality of
deliberation depends not only on the inclusion of all stakeholders among
participants, but also the ability of all stakeholders to participate on an
equal and effective basis. Fung and Wright place great emphasis on the
need to build and sustain capacity and inclusion in the deliberative and
decision-making functions. 264
258. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 269 (noting local innovation that
leads to new collective action).
259. See id. at 266-67 (discussing actions of minority groups and grass-roots
movements to advance own reforms).
260. See id. at 214 (noting that bottom-up reform started when educators were
forced to learn from each others' failures and mistakes).
261. See id. at 229-31 (discussing necessities of school reform).
262. See id. (discussing "new accountability" system).
263. See id. at 272 (describing dangers of new decentralization).
264. SeeFung & Wright, supra note 248, at 5 (noting that participatory democ-
racy relies on commitment and capabilities of ordinary people).
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Fung and Wright's model of empowered participatory democracy
provides a way to bridge the gap between the overly centralized model
imposed under some mayoral control regimes, and the lack of accounta-
bility or meaningful participation in autonomously decentralized schools.
This approach provides a structure that takes elements of both the stan-
dard-setting and accountability requirements of a centralized governance
structure, with local structures that are supported such that they have the
capacity to engage in meaningful local decision-making. In doing so, the
model avoids many of the shortcomings encountered with either a mini-
malist conception of centralized control, or overly autonomous and unac-
countable forms of decentralized governance.
The application of this mixed model requires consideration of the
deliberative process and the nature of discourse at every level. Because
different "publics" are involved at different levels of decision-making and
action, governance structures should clearly articulate the role of the
broader policy setting organizations, as compared with the involvement of
local stakeholders in supporting local innovation that is responsive to par-
ticular community school needs. Thus, the structures for public delibera-
tion and decision-making should be designed with the various "publics" in
mind. The design should allow for meaningful participation, as well as
efficient and accountable decision-making.
Applied to New York City, the "empowered participatory democracy"
and "new accountability" models offer useful templates for governance at
the Panel, CDEC and school levels. Notably, the New York State legisla-
tion creating the Panel and CDECs can be read to contemplate this form
of governance, particularly given its emphasis on transparency, training
and ongoing involvement in decision-making at both the citywide and lo-
cal levels. As noted earlier, the Panel and CDECs were intended to play an
advisory and consultative function and to have meaningful involvement in
citywide and district-level planning, policymaking and evaluation. The leg-
islation's provisions for training acknowledge the need for capacity build-
ing in order that the members of the CDECs may participate
meaningfully. In establishing the CDECs, the legislature apparently had a
more robust deliberative process in mind. This process would have local
parents and community leaders contribute in meaningful ways to the de-
velopment and implementation of policies responsive to the needs of their
school districts.
The failure of the CDECs to meet expectations of contribution to
school governance and policymaking appear to be due to the disjunction
between the theory of participation contemplated by the Mayor and Chan-
cellor, and the theories under which the legislature, parents and commu-
nities sought to operate.
Even beyond the local structures, a model of empowered par-
ticipatory governance could be designed to strengthen the ties between
the local governance entities and the citywide policymaking structure. For
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example, in New York City, the Board of Education was structured by the
legislature to include the participation of parents and residents represent-
ing various city constituencies. Though perhaps not explicitly structured
as such, the Panel represents a hybrid model of citizen and expert partici-
pation in citywide school policymaking. 265 The legislative design of the
Panel contemplates the involvement of parents and a range of stakehold-
ers in educational policymaking. The Panel, like the CDECs, could oper-
ate in a more meaningful way if given the power and capacity to do so.
V. CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
GOVERNANCE: MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE
IN THE NEW YoRK CITY EXAMPLE
As the New York City case study demonstrates, parent and public par-
ticipation in educational governance and policymaking are issues of signif-
icant public concern. The experience of mayoral control, however, in
New York City and elsewhere, thus far has resulted in mixed messages
about whether a centralized, versus a more localized and participatory
structure of school governance, is intended.
A. Empowered Participation, Democracy and New Accountability in New York
City Under Mayoral Control
From the perspective of the theories of democratic participation iden-
tified earlier, the mayoral control structures in New York City appear ei-
ther to take elements of both a minimalist and a deliberative approach, or
attempt to dress up an authoritarian approach to school governance as if it
retained elements of deliberative democracy, when in fact it does not.2 6 6
Indeed, part of the difficulty seems to be that policymakers have not
clearly identified or articulated the degree to which mayoral control must
include public participation to be effective yet responsive to reasonable
practical concerns. Further confusion seems to arise due to the conflation
of "accountability" with a minimalist, authoritarian view of governance. In
New York City, for example, the mayor appears to take the view that be-
cause he is accountable, he is empowered to make decisions unilaterally
under a minimalist conception of democratic legitimacy. The design of
New York's mayoral control legislation, and the dominant understanding
of many stakeholders, contemplates a more deliberative theory of demo-
cratic legitimacy that requires robust inclusion and deliberation in school
governance. While the mayor remains the decision-maker and the ac-
countable authority, for his decisions to be legitimate, they must include
265. Many of the original and current appointees to the Panel brought pro-
fessional and technical expertise to their work. Panel members have included edu-
cational and cultural experts, financial experts, attorneys and community
organizers, among others.
266. For a discussion of arguments professing that the way democracies regu-
larly function is as authoritative entities pretending to involve and include public
discussion and deliberation, see supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
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and be responsive to meaningful public deliberation. Viewed in this way,
it is possible to bridge the perceived gap between deliberation and ac-
countability, and clarify the executive and public roles in governance and
decision-making.
In the case of New York City's social promotion debate, the Panel
members were operating under a deliberative model with the understand-
ing that mayoral decision-making and accountability should be informed
and guided by their input. The members of the Panel for Educational
Policy sought out information from both experts and the public about the
relative benefits and drawbacks of the Mayor's proposal and set about
making an informed decision. The Mayor, however, operating under a
minimalist model, unilaterally imposed a decision by fiat because he could
remove Panel members at will. As a result, the structure for public partici-
pation was revealed to be very weak indeed.
From the minimalist perspective of democracy as a process of select-
ing authorized leaders, the social promotion vote was of little import be-
cause the Mayor was subsequently re-elected by a significant margin.
Indeed, from that perspective, the Mayor and Chancellor were operating
just as they should be. As the elected leaders, they were given the author-
ity to proceed with their plans for educational reform. The Mayor's elec-
toral victory satisfies the requirements of democracy, and the Mayor
should be given the authority to lead as he sees fit. Any disagreement with
his policies should be addressed in the next mayoral election.
From the perspective of deliberative democracy, however, the social
promotion vote was not a legitimate exercise of authority. The refusal to
consider the informed, reasonable and meaningful input of statutorily au-
thorized stakeholders and the summary imposition of a decision contrary
to evidence presented lacked democratic legitimacy. It also represented
an enormous betrayal of the letter and spirit of public participation under-
lying the continued existence of the Board of Education in the mayoral
control legislation. Indeed, as many observed, if there is no role for the
Panel for Educational Policy and the Community District Education Coun-
cils to play in informing and setting policy, then what is their purpose?
Those who take the minimalist view of mayoral control may do so in
the interests of establishing accountability and addressing school failure at
any cost. In their view, efforts at decentralized school governance and
community control have yielded chaos, inefficiency, low standards and
lack of accountability. Many argue that if mayoral control brings account-
ability that will evidence results in public schools, it may be worth giving
up opportunities for public input. What is lost in this argument is that
decentralization came as a response to similar charges leveled at the prior
centralized system in New York City. 2 6 7 Also absent from the minimalist
267. For a discussion of the charges leveled at the centralized system in New
York City, see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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view is the evidence that meaningful community involvement in public
schools is regularly associated with better school and student outcomes. 268
In addition to the practical reality that a minimalist approach to
school governance excluding community participation results only in
quicker policy decisions, and not better ones, there is a more fundamental
reason for establishing structures for public participation in educational
decision-making, particularly in large urban school districts. In urban
school districts those most affected by school decision-making have the
most limited opportunities to participate, thus every effort must be made
to provide structural support for their involvement as parents and commu-
nity members. Such urban settings show that capacity building for school
governance purposes also supports capacity building for greater citizen
participation generally.
More broadly, Habermas's discourse theory of democracy provides a
persuasive argument that a discursive approach is necessary for demo-
cratic legitimacy, both procedurally and substantively, through meaningful
involvement of the governed, and by connecting law to the lifeworld
through communicative action. As Habermas notes, the legitimacy of a
democracy depends on the degree to which the members of the society, as
free and equal consociates, are able to participate in establishing its gov-
erning structures. A democratic legitimacy grounded in the participation
of a free and equal people, requires the ability to engage in communica-
tive action that shapes democratic opinion- and will-formation. For pur-
poses of democratic education then, the opportunity for meaningful
deliberation is key to the development of legitimate school governance.
A fundamental notion in our system believes that part of the goal of
public education is to prepare young people to become full participants in
our democracy. Therefore, to shut out public participation in public
school governance sends a message at odds with one of the core purposes
of our public education system and our democracy. Public education pol-
icy must include a meaningful role for parents and the public, not only in
terms of day-to-day involvement in the schooling of one's own children,
but also in the broader enterprise of setting public education policy. For
this process to be meaningful, there must be opportunities for the com-
munity to be educated about the benefits and drawbacks of different pol-
icy approaches. There must also be recognition of the limits of that
participation, from the perspective of public resources and from an ad-
ministrative perspective.
B. Recommendations for Encouraging Meaningful Participation Under
Mayoral Control
If education truly is important to democracy, there is an obligation to
ensure that structures exist to serve the inclusive, educative and substan-
268. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 60, at 267 (explaining that grass-
roots coalitions form new collective actions that advance educational reform).
[Vol. 53: p. 297
2008] PUBLIC SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY 351
tive values of participation. Claims of inefficiency are not enough to
trump the value added by informed, substantive public participation. Nor
can low levels of actual participation serve as an excuse for dismantling
structures for participation. To the contrary, efforts must be made to en-
hance those structures so that they enable and encourage more meaning-
ful participation.
At the same time, it is important to clarify the scope and limits of
public participation in public education. The appropriate balance must
be struck between public input and participation, and the ability of teach-
ers and school administrators to effectively educate children based on pro-
fessional, well-established educational models. Such clarification is also
necessary for purposes of transparency: so that parents and the public
know the scope and limits of their involvement.
Even within the context of a more centralized and directly accounta-
ble system, there can exist meaningful avenues for parent and public par-
ticipation. The structures the New York State legislature put in place for
purposes of community involvement must be adhered to, so that they may
operate as a meaningful counterweight to centralized control. The ongo-
ing criticism of New York City's Mayor and Schools Chancellor for failing
to meaningfully involve the public will have implications for the mayoral
control legislation that is scheduled to sunset in 2009.
Based on the experience with the Panel for Educational Policy and
the CDECs, any legislative extension of New York City mayoral control
should examine this question closely. If the Panel and CDECs were meant
to play a deliberative and substantive role, any legislation continuing the
current mayoral control structure should include clear mechanisms for
training and capacity building that are supported and enforced. Such leg-
islation also should include provisions that Panel members serve for terms,
rather than at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, it should
require that a portion of the mayoral appointees include parents of stu-
dents currently enrolled in the public schools. In addition, the duties and
responsibilities of the Panel should be clarified, particularly as they relate
to the meaning of the Panel's vote on policies affecting public schools.
The legislation regarding the CDECs should clarify their role at the local
level and should include mechanisms to ensure that training and capacity
building requirements are carried through. Such changes are necessary if
the Panel and the CDECs are to have a meaningful role in governance.
To the extent that the existence of these bodies represents a decision by
the legislature that there should exist a deliberative process as relates to
public school policy on the citywide and school district levels, these bodies
must be given the ability to perform their duties in an informed manner.
Finally, there is a need for greater clarity regarding the role public
participation in governance is meant to play in improving school quality
and student achievement. Some observers take the view that governance
changes, particularly those at the citywide, state and federal levels, are far
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removed from local schools, and do not have an impact on school quality
and student achievement.269 School governance changes at every level
should set forth the goals of their structures and powers for improving
student achievement, and should engage in ongoing efforts to build ca-
pacity, provide support and reduce burdens at the local level, where edu-
cation actually happens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public participation is essential to well-functioning school governance
and to legitimate democracy. Under a discourse theory of democracy, the
ongoing procedural and substantive involvement of members of the pub-
lic is necessary to establish and sustain democratic legitimacy, to
strengthen democratic participation generally, and to improve school out-
comes. For mayoral control to work in a manner that improves substan-
tive outcomes and public acceptability, there must be transparency,
oversight and meaningful accountability. This requires that the public,
including parents, be aware of and involved in key decisions about educa-
tion. Additionally, for important policy decisions regarding testing and
retention, and even bus route changes, the governance structure must be
subject to public notice. This notice of adequate prior information facili-
tates deliberation that ensures meaningful input that will improve out-
comes while enhancing civic involvement and teaching children what
citizenship and democratic education ought to mean.
269. See Larry Cuban, A Solution That Lost Its Problem: Centralized Policymaking
and Classroom Gains, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? 124 (Noel Epstein ed., Brookings
Inst. Press 2004) (criticizing governance changes at city, state and federal levels).
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